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The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch  
THOMAS H. LEE* 
This Article explains  what  the law  of  nations  meant  at  the  time  the 
United States was established and how it interacted with the original U.S. 
Constitution. The “law of nations” was not only a historical term for modern 
customary international law, it (1) was sometimes a broad term for all inter-
national law, including  conventions  or  treaties—the “conventional” law  of 
nations; (2) included principles of domestic law perceived to be shared by all 
civilized  nations;  (3)  was  a  source  of  the  U.S. law  of federalism,  given  the 
early  American  view  that  the  states  retained residual  sovereignty  beyond 
what was conferred on the new general government by the Constitution; and 
(4)  was  perceived  in  part  as  unwritten natural law.  The  Americans  who 
adopted the Constitution were keenly aware of their place in the world as a 
militarily  weak  new  state  in  need  of  peace  and  trade  with  the  European 
powers  for survival,  and thus  eager  to comply  with the law of nations—the 
intramural rules of the European world order. They recognized that the judi-
cial branch could play an important role in advancing the new nation’s inter-
national  acceptance  and survival  by  judicious deployment  of  the law  of 
nations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, which is why eight of the nine 
constitutional  grants  of judicial  power  in Article  III implicated  the law  of 
nations. The law of nations was the original federal common law.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Professors Anthony J. Bellia and Bradford R. Clark have written a valuable 
book unfolding a new theory of how the law of nations interacts with the U.S.  
Constitution.1  The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution questions 
the facile presumption that modern customary international law is synonymous 
with the traditional law of nations and exposes the fallacy that the law of nations 
is a simple construct. Bellia and Clark offer, instead, a tripartite categorization of 
its principal fields: the law merchant, the law maritime, and the law of state-state 
relations.2  
Their  book reminds us of the  importance of engaging  history and of under-
standing the role that the law of nations played in the original U.S. constitutional 
order. But,  at the end of the day, Bellia  and Clark’s historical analysis suffers  
from an undue focus on present controversies about whether modern customary 
international law—most prominently,  human  rights law—is federal law,  and 
about the role of the federal courts in foreign affairs. Bellia and Clark essentially 
end up on the “no” side of the “modern customary international law as federal 
law” debate, with the exception of what they call the law of state-state relations. 
They argue that this traditional law of nations, anchored in respect for the sover-
eignty of a nation-state within its borders, logically trumps any claim that an act 
by the United States or any other nation-state has violated human rights protected 
under  modern  customary international law.  The  consequence  is  that federal 
courts should  dismiss lawsuits alleging  such  human-rights claims  rather  than 
decide them on the merits. Bellia and Clark assert, as a general matter, that the 
original constitutional plan entailed judicial passivity in foreign relations because 
the  Constitution exclusively  grants  the political  branches all  foreign relations  
powers.3 
My two aims in this Article are to draw a more complete picture of the histori-
cal  understanding  of  the law  of  nations  at  the  Founding  and  to  show  how  the 
Constitution as originally framed envisioned an affirmative role for the judiciary 
in U.S. foreign policy. Framing the central inquiry as whether the law of nations 
was federal law or state law makes historical findings more portable to modern 
contexts,  but  it  is  not faithful  to  the original  context.  Late  eighteenth-century 
American lawyers  and  judges  did  not  perceive  sharp  distinctions  between  the 
laws of separate sovereigns, having trained and practiced at a time when law was 
perceived  to  be  a universal discipline  with general principles applicable  to all 
civilized nations. Bellia and Clark have performed a valuable service by expand-
ing our understanding of the diversity of the law of nations, but the law of nations  
1.  ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES  
CONSTITUTION (2017).  
2.  Id. at xiii.  
3.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 270 (“by giving the political branches exclusive authority  
over  the  accepted  means  of  pursuing  redress against  foreign  nations, the Constitution  authorized  the 
political branches exclusively to decide whether, when, and how the United States would pursue redress  
against foreign nations for their misconduct”).  
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was far more nuanced than their tripartite subject-matter characterization pre-
sumes. And, in contrast to Bellia and Clark’s tale of judicial passivity in foreign 
relations at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, I will tell an originalist story of 
constitutionally-authorized judicial activism in foreign affairs. 
The written Constitution and its adopters designed the judicial branch to play a 
dynamic role in the conduct of the United States’ foreign policy, not merely to 
follow the political branches’ lead. And the federal courts in fact played this role 
in the first decades of the new Republic. Because the United States was a new and 
weak state desirous of commerce and peace with the European powers but fearful 
of  their  intervention  in  the  Americas,  the federal  courts typically  exercised 
restraint and were deferential to the sovereignty of foreign states. Ascertaining 
and applying the law of nations, most significantly the law of maritime warfare, 
was the medium by which the judiciary branch was to play its essential foreign 
relations role. The law of nations was the original federal common law. By this I 
mean that the law of nations was to be the default source of rules of decision for 
federal courts to apply in cases and controversies before them “except where the  
constitution,  treaties  or  statutes  of  the  United  States  otherwise  require  or  pro-
vide,” pursuant to parts of all nine grants of judicial power in Article III and its 
original implementing legislation—the First Judiciary Act of 1789. 4 And this was 
regardless of what state legislatures or state courts might have to say about the  
cases and controversies in question. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly describes Bellia and Clark’s 
argument. Part II provides a fuller description of the “law of nations” as it was 
perceived in the late eighteenth century. Specifically, it sets out four dimensions 
of  the late  eighteenth-century  conception  of  the law  of  nations  missing  from 
Bellia and Clark’s account. Part III describes Article III’s grants of judicial power 
and  examines  how  these  grants  empowered  the federal  courts  to  decide  cases 
using rules  drawn  from  the law  of  nations.  It also  describes  how  the  First 
Congress selectively implemented these constitutional grants in the Judiciary  
Act of 1789. Part IV asserts that the respect for nation-state sovereignty that 
Bellia  and Clark  attribute  to  the  state-state relations  branch  of  the law  of 
nations is the manifestation of a deeper political principle—the commitment of 
a new, militarily weak revolutionary republic to autonomous self-government 
and reciprocal  non-intervention  by  the  European  great  powers.  The  right  of 
such a new state to be treated as an equal sovereign and thus to be left alone by 
the powerful  European  monarchies—most importantly  Great  Britain—was  the 
foundation stone of the new Republic and its constitutional order with respect to 
foreign relations.  It  is  this original geopolitical context—inapplicable  to  the 
United  States today as the leading world  power—and  not the law  of state-state 
relations—that explains the special regard for sovereign autonomy in the U.S. con-
stitutional order, not the traditional law of state-state relations. In fact, the law of  
4.  Judiciary  Act  of  1789,  ch.  20,  §  34,  1  Stat.  73,  92  (codified  as  amended  at  28  U.S.C.  §  1333  
(2012)).  
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state-state relations has itself evolved over the intervening centuries. It no longer 
adheres to the organizing principle that the sovereign state is the only actor on the 
international plane, most importantly by recognizing the validity of international 
human rights claims against such states. Accordingly, Bellia and Clark’s presump-
tion that the law of state-state relations today is essentially the same as it was in 
1787 is misleading. A brief conclusion offers modern takeaways from the histori-
cal understanding sketched in this Article.  
I. BELLIA AND CLARK ON THE LAW OF NATIONS  
The primary insight of The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution 
is that the law of nations comprises three different bodies of law: the law mer-
chant, the law maritime, and the law of state-state relations. 5 The law merchant is 
the general commercial law associated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1842 deci- 
sion  in  Swift  v.  Tyson.6 This  body  of law included rules  about  when  and  how 
cross-border commercial contracts were formed and satisfied, such as proofs of 
debt and methods of acceptable payment. 7 A century later, in Erie Railroad Co.  
v. Tompkins, the Court famously disavowed the law merchant as a source of rules 
of  decision  in  citizen-on-citizen  diversity  suits  in federal  court. 8  The  second 
branch of the law of nations—the law maritime—encompasses the extinct law of 
prize (adjudication of title to ships and cargoes seized in wartime) and the extant 
law  of admiralty  (the law  of  peacetime  transport  and casualties  on navigable  
waters).9 Under the century-old decision in  Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,10 fed-
eral  courts still  retain judicial  power  to  decide admiralty  and  maritime  cases  
5.  See  BELLIA  &  CLARK,  supra note  1,  at  xiii  (defining  “the law  merchant,  the law  of  state-state 
relations, and the law maritime” as “the three traditional branches of the law of nations” at the time of  
the Constitution’s adoption).  
6.  41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 29–32.  
7.  See, e.g., Swift, 41 U.S. at 19–20; see also  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 26–32. 
8.  304 U.S. 64, 74–80 (1938) (holding, in part, that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State,” which is 
“not a matter of federal concern” but rather “shall be declared by [the State’s] Legislature in a statute or  
by its highest court in a decision”); see also  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 132 (“Originally, federal 
courts applied the law merchant as general law in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction, subject to 
any alterations or displacement by local state law. Once states abandoned judicial application of general 
law such as the law merchant in favor of local state law,  Erie eventually interpreted the Constitution to 
require federal courts to apply state law in the absence of an applicable provision of the Constitution or a 
federal statute.”).  
9.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 113–34. Bellia and Clark assert: 
The law maritime encompassed both public matters governed by the law of state-state relations 
(such as prize cases) and private transactions governed by general maritime law (such as mari-
time commerce)[,] . . . [and] provided a body of general law comparable to—and sometimes 
overlapping with—the law merchant for cases within the jurisdiction of admiralty courts. As 
Justice Joseph Story explained, admiralty jurisdiction was ‘divisible into two great branches, 
one embracing captures, and questions of prize, arising jure belli; the other embracing acts, 
torts, and injuries strictly of civil cognizance, independent of belligerent operations.’   
Id. at 113–14. 
 
10.  244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
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based  on general principles  of  maritime law,  now mostly  framed  in  Supreme 
Court precedents, even if contrary to applicable state law. 11  The third branch of 
the law of nations—the law of state-state relations—defines duties and obliga- 
tions among sovereign states.12 Bellia and Clark assert that “the Constitution was 
designed to interact in distinct ways with each of the three traditional branches of 
the law of nations that existed when it was adopted.” 13 
The three branches of the law of nations that Bellia and Clark theorize are not 
created equal in their account: 14 the law of state-state relations is paramount. 15 
First, they assert, the law of state-state relations is an important interpretive tool 
because it helps to explain the original meanings of many of the foreign relations  
provisions in the Constitution.16 For instance, the law of state-state relations gener-
ated the list of war powers in Article I, Section 8: “To declare War, grant Letters 
of  Marque  and Reprisal,  and  make Rules  concerning  Captures  on  Land  and  
Water.”17 To understand what “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” are, we must look 
to the law-of-nation treatise writers consulted by early Americans; the two most 
prominent such writers were William Blackstone and Emer de Vattel. 18 Likewise, 
it  is  the law  of  state-state relations,  again  as  set  forth  in  eighteenth-century 
11.  244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law 
which shall prevail throughout the country. . . . And . . . in the absence of some controlling statute the 
general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to 
matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted); see also  BELLIA & CLARK,  
supra note 1, at 128–31 (analyzing the Court’s decision in  Jensen, including the precedential effect of its 
holding “that general maritime law operates as preemptive federal law in some instances because Article 
III’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction incorporates it as federal law”).  
12.  See  BELLIA  &  CLARK,  supra note  1,  at  73–112  (discussing  the evolution  and historical 
applications of the law of state–state relations protecting nations’ “territorial sovereignty” with “limited  
exceptions”).  
13.  Id. at xiii.  
14.  See, e.g., id. at 131 (explaining that the law maritime is the only of the three branches “that the 
Supreme Court has found to be incorporated as federal law by an Article III jurisdictional grant”).  
15.  See  id.  at  269  (“For  the  Founders,  the  most  important  branch  of  the law  of  nations  to  the 
collective interests of the United States was the law of state-state relations.”).  
16.  See  id.  at  50  (“It  is  not possible  to  understand  [the Article  I  and Article  II  grants  of  foreign 
relations] powers—let alone determine their effect—without consulting background principles of the 
law of nations against which they were drafted and ratified.”). See generally  MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE  
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT  IN  FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007) (explaining the “interpretive power” of the law of 
nations in the realm of international affairs).  
17.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  
18. See generally  4 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769);  
EMMERICH  DE  VATTEL, 3 THE  LAW OF  NATIONS  in NATURAL  LAW  AND  ENLIGHTENMENT  CLASSICS  1  
(Be´la Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008) (1758). 
Blackstone’s Commentaries and Vattel’s  Law of Nations were the first two books the Senate bought 
for  its library  in  1794.  4  A NNALS  OF  CONG.  65  (1794)  (“Ordered,  That  the  Secretary  purchase 
Blackstone’s  Commentaries,  and Vattel’s  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  for  the  use  of  the  Senate.”). 
Vattel’s book was a monograph focused exclusively on the law of nations. Blackstone’s four-volume 
treatise covered all of English law, and included a brief but highly-influential discussion of the law of 
nations in Volume 4. On the influence of Blackstone, see Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and 
the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact , 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 738–47 (1976). On 
Vattel’s importance to early American statesmen and jurists, see Thomas H. Lee,  Making Sense of the 
Eleventh  Amendment: International  Law  and  State  Sovereignty ,  96  NW.  U.  L.  REV.  1027,  1061–67  
(2002).  
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treatises,  that illuminates  distinctions  between similar constitutional  words like  
“Treaties”19  and “Agreement or Compact,”20  and as among “Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls.” 21 The law merchant and maritime law do not have 
the same dictionary leverage in constitutional interpretation, except that the latter 
helps to ascertain the scope of the national “judicial Power,” 22 that extends “to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” 23 
Second, the law of state-state relations, according to Bellia and Clark, is the 
only one of the three fields of the traditional law of nations that survives as federal 
judge-made law binding on the states in a significant way. 24  True, the peacetime 
enclave of maritime law persists because of  Jensen, despite its tension with the 
holding in  Erie.25 But the enactment of federal statutes has dramatically narrowed 
federal judicial power to make law for the seas, which in turn, has declined in sig-
nificance following  the  transformations  in  transportation technology  since  the 
age of sail which have rendered maritime transport more reliable and secure. By 
contrast, given increasing globalization, the law of state-state relations arises in 
federal  courts  in  greater  and  more  diverse  contexts  whenever  the laws,  judg-
ments,  or  acts  of  foreign  states  or officials  are implicated  in  a  suit  in federal  
court.26 The paradigmatic example of this branch of the law of nations is the act 
of state doctrine, which requires federal courts to abstain from passing on the le-
gality  of  the  acts  of  foreign  sovereigns  within  their  jurisdictions, regardless 
whether state law would permit a U.S. court to do so. 27 Bellia and Clark make a 
general claim that, like the act of state doctrine, “[l]ong-standing Supreme Court 
precedent supports the proposition that courts must uphold the traditional rights 
of foreign sovereigns under the law of state-state relations against the conflicting 
demands of state law.” 28 
Bellia and Clark’s historical account draws more modest missions of restraint 
and abstention for the judicial branch vis-a `-vis the national political branches in 
matters touching upon U.S. foreign policy and relations. The Constitution grants  
to Congress and the President the powers to recognize foreign nations, wage war,  
19.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2;  id. art. VI, cl. 2.  
20.  Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.  
21.  Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
22.  Id. art. III, § 1.  
23.  Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
24.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 272 (“[T]he Constitution’s exclusive allocation of specific 
foreign relations powers to the political branches preempts state law that would deny foreign nations 
their traditional rights under the law of state-state relations.”).  
25.  Cf. id. at 115, 128–29 (describing the Court’s “contrast[ing]” holdings in  Erie and Jensen).  
26.  See,  e.g., Animal  Sci.  Prods.,  Inc.  v.  Hebei Welcome  Pharm.  Co.,  138  S.  Ct.  1865  (2018) 
(reversing Second Circuit’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 to require binding 
deference to Chinese government regarding Chinese law in an  amicus brief filed in federal district court 
urging reversal of a  jury verdict against  Chinese vitamin-C  manufacturers for violating the  Sherman  
Act).  
27.  See,  e.g.,  Banco Nacional de Cuba  v. Sabbatino,  376  U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The  act of state 
doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity 
of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”).  
28.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 245.  
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regulate commerce, and conduct diplomatic relations with foreign sovereigns. 29 
Accordingly, Bellia and Clark assert that “judicial respect for the rights of recog-
nized foreign states under the law of nations has served to uphold recognition of 
foreign nations and governments by the political branches.” 30 This insight enables 
a neat and logical rejoinder to advocates’ efforts to vindicate customary interna-
tional law-based human rights claims in U.S. federal courts. If the courts did pass 
on the legality of foreign sovereign acts and afford remedies to private litigants, 
they would transgress on “the political branches[’] exclusive authority over the  
accepted means of pursuing redress against foreign nations.”31  In other words, 
Bellia and Clark argue that the traditional law of nations field of state-state rela-
tions,  grounded  in  the principle  that  one  sovereign  may  not challenge  what 
another sovereign does within its borders and committed to the political branches 
under the Constitution, trumps the customary international law of human rights  
of more recent vintage. 
In  this  way, Bellia  and Clark  fashion  a  new  history-based  contribution  to 
current debates about the status and role of customary international law and how 
federal courts should respond when they encounter it. The majority view among 
U.S. foreign relations scholars is that modern customary international law is always 
federal law, entitled to Supremacy Clause effect on par with the Constitution, trea-
ties, and congressional statutes, and therefore binding on the states. 32 As support for 
their  position,  these scholars  invoke  iconic historical  statements  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  statesmen,  and  jurists,  that proclaim  the law  of  nations  as  the law  of  the  
United States.33 The most famous of these is Justice Horace Gray’s ringing endorse- 
ment in The Paquete Habana: “International law is part of our law, and must be  
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as 
often  as  questions  of  right  depending  upon  it  are duly  presented  for  their  
determination.”34  
29.  See id. at xix–xxii. Bellia and Clark do not take a position on how separation-of-powers disputes 
between  these  two political  branches should  be resolved.  See  id.  at  232  (“We  do  not  attempt  to 
determine  the  precise allocation  of  war  and  foreign relations  powers  between  Congress  and  the  
President”).  
30.  Id. at 73.  
31.  Id. at 270.  
32.  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? , 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 
1825–27 (1998) (defending the position that customary international law is federal law in response to 
Professors Bradley  and Goldsmith’s article,  Curtis  A. Bradley  &  Jack  L. Goldsmith,  Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position , 110 HARV. L. REV. 815  
(1997)).  
33. See generally , Koh, supra note 32, at 1830–41 (discussing the “history and doctrine,” including 
Supreme Court precedent, “invoke[d]” in one such scholarly account). 
34.  175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Bellia and Clark correctly point out that Gray’s statement involved the 
now-extinct field of maritime prize law, over which the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction and 
where  it  was widely  accepted  that federal  judge-made law displaced all  state laws.  See  BELLIA  &  
CLARK, supra note 1, at 145 & n.20, 163–64, 218–19. Blackstone’s remark in his  Commentaries is as 
often cited as canonical support for the view that the law of nations was part of England’s common law: 
“the law of nations . . . is here adopted in it[s] full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of 
the law  of  the land.” 4  B LACKSTONE, supra  note 18, at *67; see also William  S.  Dodge,  Customary 
International Law, Change, and the Constitution , 106 GEO. L.J. 1559 (2018).  
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More recently, scholars seeking to revise the majority view have asserted that 
customary international law is not presumptively federal law that preempts state 
law.35 These revisionists dismiss historical statements, including such statements 
affirming  the law  of  nations  as  the law  of  the  United  States,  as  artifacts  of  a  
bygone era, retired by the iconic Erie decision. They conclude that modern cus-
tomary international law warrants no recognition as federal law in any circum-
stance,  whether  as  a  hook  for  obtaining federal  court  jurisdiction  or  as  an 
independent body of law generating rules of decision that preempt contrary state 
law.36 A third group of scholars takes the middle ground and asserts that custom-
ary international law is non-binding general law analogous to the law merchant. 37 
Bellia  and Clark’s  thesis  that  the law  of  nations  operated differently  across 
their  three  designated  subject  matters  eschews  the all-or-nothing  approach  of 
both the majority who claim that customary international law is always federal 
law, and the revisionists who claim that it is not. According to Bellia and Clark, 
the  enduring law  of  state-state relations  is still federal law that  preempts  state 
law,  but  “[m]odern  customary international law  represents  a  new  and  distinct 
branch of international law.” 38 They assert that federal courts should not view 
this new customary international law, most prominently human rights norms out-
side  of  U.S.  ratified  treaties,  as  preemptive federal law  because  to  do  so  with 
encroach upon the traditional law of state-state relations entrusted to the political  
branches. 
Their argument is novel, but its takeaway approximates the revisionists’ con-
clusion: federal judges should leave diplomacy and foreign affairs to the national 
political  branches  and  abstain  from  recognizing individual-rights claims  under 
customary international law as federal law. Bellia and Clark depart from the revi-
sionists  on  one  prescription:  their  acceptance  of  the displacement  of  state law 
in  the traditional law-of-nations field  of  state-state relations.  “The  Constitu- 
tion’s allocation of powers—understood in historical context and as applied by 
the Supreme Court in practice—requires U.S. courts to apply some rules of cus-
tomary international law  to  preempt  state law.” 39  But  this  point  of  difference, 
ironically, makes them even more hostile than the revisionists to the modern cus-
tomary international law  of  human  rights.  This  is  because  their  thesis  gives 
U.S.  courts  a federal law basis—namely,  the law  of  state-state relations—for  
35. See generally Bradley  & Goldsmith,  supra  note  32  (“We  have  argued  that,  in  the  absence  of 
federal political branch authorization, [customary international law (CIL)] is not a source of federal law. 
Certain doctrinal  consequences follow  from  this  argument.  First,  as  a general  matter,  a  case  arising 
under  CIL would  not  by that  fact alone establish federal  question  jurisdiction.  Second, federal  court 
interpretations of CIL would not be binding on the federal political branches or the states.”); Phillip R. 
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law , 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 716–21, 717 n.185 
(1986) (arguing against “judicial application of customary international law” due to “the incompatibility 
of the process of [its] formation with American political philosophy”).  
36.  See Trimble, supra note 35, at 678–84.  
37.  See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law , 42 VA. J.  
INT’L. L. 365, 369–70 (2002).  
38.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 166.  
39.  Id. at 268 (emphasis removed).  
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declining to entertain such human rights claims, even when they are framed as 
state-law claims 40 or as customary international law presented as state-law claims 
in accordance with Bradley and Goldsmith’s revisionist understanding. And this 
would be true in state or in federal court, because the federal law of state-state 
relations would be binding on state judges, too. 41  
II. WHAT WAS THE LAW OF NATIONS 
Bellia and Clark’s division of the law of nations into three branches is bold and  
new, but I am not so sure it is right. To start with, their tripartite characterization of 
the law of nations was not used near the time of the Founding; rather, the most com-
mon subject-matter division in the law of nations at that time was between the laws 
of war and the laws of peace.  42 Nevertheless, their scheme has a certain appeal 
because it corresponds roughly to the subject matter of many cases on the dockets of 
the early federal courts—admiralty, commercial law, and prize law. Interestingly, 
the very branch of the law of nations that Bellia and Clark emphasize—the law of 
state-state relations—came  up most frequently  in  prize  cases  during  the  United 
States’ first century. Prize law was the wartime branch of maritime law, just as ad-
miralty law was its peacetime half. Bellia and Clark frame prize cases as “part of 
the larger law of state-state relations,” citing Blackstone. 43 But Blackstone does 
not refer to “disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom 
bills”44 as being governed by the law of state-state relations. 45 Indeed, the law of 
“shipwrecks”—for example, who owns a shipwreck, or what is the reward under 
the law of salvage for saving cargo from a sinking ship—seems to bear no direct 
connection to the law of state-state relations. Instead, what Blackstone  does say 
about the law that should decide such “disputes relating to prizes” is that “there 
is  no  other rule  of  decision  but  this  great universal law, collected  from  history 
and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages as are generally approved 
and allowed  of.” 46 What  this example illustrates  is  that Blackstone  and  other 
Founding-era sources did not perceive Bellia and Clark’s distinction among three 
branches of the law of nations, but instead saw it as one undifferentiated body of 
rules of decision distilled “from history and usage” and from “generally approved” 
international scholars. 
In  my  opinion, Bellia  and Clark’s  definition  does incomplete  justice  to  the 
breadth and nuance of the law of nations as understood by Americans at the time  
40.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (West 1999) (California statute authorizing redress for 
victims  of  foreign slave labor,  with  an  eye  to  affording  redress  to  victims  of  Japanese imperial 
aggression during World War II). 
41. Bellia and Clark do not explicitly say that the law of state-state relations is “the law of the United 
States” under the Supremacy Clause, but that seems to be a logical inference from their argument.  
42.  See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, 1 THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND OF PEACE, reprinted in NATURAL LAW AND  
ENLIGHTENMENT CLASSICS (Richard Tuck ed., 2005) (1625).  
43.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 117 & n.7.  
44.  Id. (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67).  
45.  See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.  
46.  Id.  
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of the Constitution’s adoption and initial implementation. It is under-inclusive of 
how the law of nations interacts with the U.S. Constitution in four key respects: 
the law of nations (1) was sometimes a broad term for all international law, includ-
ing conventions or treaties—the “conventional” law of nations; (2) included prin-
ciples of domestic law perceived to be shared by all civilized nations; (3) was a 
source of the U.S. law of federalism, given the early American view that the states 
retained residual sovereignty beyond what was conferred on the new general gov-
ernment by the Constitution; and (4) was perceived in part as unwritten natural 
law. 
First, a common usage of “law of nations” in the late eighteenth century was as 
an umbrella term equivalent to “international law” today. This usage would have 
included not only customs, but conventions or treaties. Indeed, Vattel referred to 
treaties as the “conventional law of nations.” 47 Professors Cleveland and Dodge 
have recently argued that this umbrella meaning of “law of nations” is the proper 
reading  of Article  I’s  grant  of  power  to  Congress  “[t]o  define  and  punish  .  .  .  
Offences  against  the  Law  of  Nations.”48 Recognizing  the possibility  of  this 
broader  usage  is essential  to  interpreting  other  Founding-era  references  to  the 
“law of nations” and, consequently, their relevance and ramifications for the pres- 
ent day. 
Second, Bellia and Clark’s tripartite subject-matter formulation neglects a sub-
set of the law of nations that was central to early American jurists: principles of 
law shared by the domestic legal systems of all civilized nations. These principles 
are still considered one of the three primary sources of international law today, as 
the Statute of the modern International Court of Justice explicitly states. 49 A “uni-
versal” principle was one that all sovereigns shared; a “general” principle was  
one that most sovereigns shared.50 The basic idea was that the legal systems and 
jurisprudence  of all civilized  nations  shared certain  basic principles.  Domestic 
constitutions reflected these principles, but they were not constitutive of them; 
nor could they destroy them. 
Blackstone  described  this  branch  of  the law  of  nations  with  characteristic 
lucidity: 
[T]he law of nations . . . is here adopted in it[s] full extent by the common 
law . . . . And those acts of parliament . . . made to enforce this universal law, 
or  to facilitate  the  execution  of  it[s]  decisions,  are  not  to  be  considered  as  
47.  VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 24, at 77.  
48.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10;  id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of  
Nations”). See generally Sarah  H. Cleveland  & William S. Dodge,  Defining and Punishing Offenses  
Under Treaties, 124 YALE L. J. 2202 (2015). 
49.  The statute identifies three primary sources of international law for the International Court of 
Justice to apply: treaties; “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;” and 
“the general principles  of law  recognized  by civilized  nations.” Statute  of  the International  Court  of  
Justice art. 38, ¶ 1.  
50.  See, e.g., Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).  
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introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental  
constitutions of the kingdom[,] without which it must cease to be a part of the 
civilized world. 51  
In his “Law of Nations” entry for the Encyclopedia Americana , Justice Joseph 
Story divided the law of nations into “external” and “internal” halves. 52 His exter-
nal law of nations correspondeds roughly to Bellia and Clark’s three subject mat-
ters, especially the law of state-to-state relations. 53 The internal law of nations, 
Story reasoned, was synonymous with the “public law of the state.” 54 This branch 
of the law of nations included two types of enacted positive laws (laws “from pos-
itive  institution”)  and laws  arising  from  “the principles  of natural  justice” 55— 
comprising Story’s formulation of the general principles of domestic law shared 
by civilized nations. 56 This is what Blackstone had earlier referred to as the “uni-
versal law” that was incorporated into the common law ensuring that England 
was “a part of the civilized world.” 57 
It is difficult to convey just how important the “general principles of domestic 
law” branch of the law of nations was to American constitutionalism in its first 
century.  A  famous example  may  suffice  to  make  the  point.  The  doctrine  of 
national constitutional limits on “personal jurisdiction” in state courts now makes 
its home in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that was 
not the legal basis of the iconic decision that created the doctrine. 58 The constitu-
tional holding in  Pennoyer v. Neff was based on general principles of the law of  
nations.59  The question in Pennoyer was whether an Oregon court could enforce 
a judgment against a nonresident when the plaintiff did not serve process on the  
defendant in Oregon or attach the defendant’s property in Oregon before bringing  
51.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.  
52.  See Joseph Story, Law of Nations, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA  AMERICANA 141–49 (Francis Lieber ed., 
Phila., Thomas, Coperthwait & Co. 1838); see also id. at 141 (“It would be . . . correct . . . to divide [the 
law of nations] into two great leading heads, namely, the internal law of nations , or that which arises 
from the relations between the sovereign and the people, and the external law of nations , or that which 
arises from the relations between different nations.”).  
53.  Cf  id.  (defining  the external law  of  nations  as  synonymous  with  “international law ”  and 
“divisible into two heads, the one which regulates the rights, intercourse and obligations of nations, as 
such, with each other; the other, which regulates the rights and obligations more immediately belonging 
to their respective subjects,” with “[t]he former . . . frequently denominated the public law of nations , 
and the latter the private law of nations ”).  
54.  Id. at 141 (emphasis removed).  
55.  Id.  
56.  Id.  
57.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.  
58.  U.S.  CONST.  amd.  XIV.  The  state  court  judgment  at  issue  in  Pennoyer  v.  Neff  ,  95  U.S.  714  
(1878), had been rendered in February 1866, id. at 719, more than two years before the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in July 1868.  Id. at 733 (“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal  Constitution,  the validity  of  such  judgments  may  be directly  questioned,  and  their  
enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the 
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due 
process of law.”).  
59.  See id.  
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suit.60 Justice Stephen Field’s opinion for the Court held that it could not: “The 
authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the 
State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those 
limits would  be  deemed  in  every  other  forum  .  .  .  an illegitimate  assumption  
of power.”61 Justice Field described this as “a principle of general, if not univer-
sal, law.” 62 This principle was actually: 
[T]wo well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of 
an independent State over persons and property. . . . One of these principles is 
that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons 
and property within its territory. . . . The other principle of public law referred 
to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct ju- 
risdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.63 
In support of these principles, Field cited two authorities: Joseph Story’s trea-
tise on the conflict of laws and Henry Wheaton’s treatise on international law. 64 It  
is worth pausing to consider the magnitude of what the majority’s decision stands 
for in terms of constitutional decisionmaking by the Supreme Court at the time.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer was based not on any constitutional 
text, hypothesized original meaning, prior Supreme Court precedent, or historical 
practice. A landmark constitutional holding was justified exclusively on the basis 
of general principles of the law of nations as derived from leading treatises.  
Finding general principles of domestic law among civilized nations  from the 
“internal” branch of the law of nations as set out by treatise-writers was a vital 
conduit for interaction between the law of nations and the U.S. Constitution in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet it is entirely absent from Bellia and 
Clark’s analysis. The reason for the lacuna, in my view, is that Bellia and Clark 
focus exclusively on customary international law when looking to the historical 
law of nations. American lawyers today tend to bifurcate international law into 
only  treaties  and  customs,  ignoring  the  existence  of general principles  despite 
their standing as a third primary source of international law even today. 65  But 
acknowledging that the traditional law of nations included a concept of best prac-
tices among civilized nations is necessary to uncover an accurate understanding 
of  the  significance  of  the law  of  nations  for  the  U.S.  Constitution  from  the  
Founding to the end of the nineteenth century.  
60.  Id. at 715–19.  
61.  Id. at 720.  
62.  Id.  
63.  Id. at 722.  
64.  See id. (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES  ON THE CONFLICT OF  LAWS (Bos., Hilliard, Gray,  
&  Co.  1834)  and  HENRY  WHEATON,  ELEMENTS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW (Phila.,  Carey,  Lea  & 
Blanchard 1836)). 
65. Bellia  and Clark,  for example,  do  not  identify general principles  of law  as  a  category  of 
international law in their book. See generally  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1.  
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Moreover, the documented reliance on the general principles branch of the law 
of nations for constitutional rulings vis-a `-vis the states and citizens in the United 
States’  first  century  has  important potential  consequences  for  today.  First,  it 
would seem to support the controversial modern practice of the Supreme Court’s 
turning to customary international law norms and the best practices of other mod-
ern jurisprudential systems to interpret the U.S. Constitution. 66  Second, modern 
international lawyers  recognize  a  subset  of international law  norms called  jus  
cogens—norms  that  are  so fundamental  to  the community  of civilized  nations  
that they cannot be contracted out of by treaty or otherwise shirked by any sover- 
eign state.67 The most commonly acknowledged  jus cogens norms are prohibi-
tions against torture, slavery and the slave trade, and genocide. 68 
Given the resemblance between the rationales for the modern  jus cogens and 
the traditional logic of the “internal” law of nations, a strong argument might be  
made that jus cogens human rights norms should be treated as binding federal 
law that preempts contrary state law. Bellia and Clark’s law of state-state rela- 
tions provides no affirmative defense to this argument because eighteenth-century 
Anglo-American jurists like Blackstone agreed that general principles were prin-
ciples “without  which  . .  . [a country] must cease  to be a part of the civilized 
world.”69 Although Bellia and Clark’s thesis provides an unsatisfactory rejoinder, 
I think that they are ultimately right that the U.S. constitutional framework would 
not  permit  an international  norm  of  substantive  conduct  (against slavery,  for 
example) to preempt state law if written federal law (the Constitution, statutes, 
and treaties) did not independently frame the norm. But, as I will demonstrate in 
Part III, this is because of a political fact—the nature of the founding American 
conception  of  sovereignty—not  because  of  the law  of  state-state relations,  as 
Bellia and Clark posit.  
Pennoyer powerfully illustrates not only the second way in which Bellia and 
Clark’s  conception  of  the law  of  nations  is under-inclusive,  but also  the  third 
way: the law of nations was a source of the federal law of  interstate relations, not   
66.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“at least from the time of the Court’s  
decision in Trop [v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)], the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and 
to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”).  
67.  The  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties,  which  the  United  States  has  not  ratified  but 
which is widely accepted as consistent with customary international law on this point, provides: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law  is  a  norm  accepted  and  recognized  by  the international  community  of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modi-
fied only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.   
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 (entered  
into force Jan. 27, 1980).  
68.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702  
(AM. LAW. INST. 1987).  
69.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.  
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just international relations. 70 At  the  Founding,  the several  United  States  were 
each perceived to possess sovereignty analogous to a fully sovereign state, except 
for  the  powers  ceded  to  the  new national  government  in  the  Constitution. 71 
Consequently,  “the  founding  generation  borrowed  from  the law  of  nations  to 
address issues of constitutional federalism (certainly a far more useful compass in 
this respect than English common law) in their statebuilding project.” 72 By this I 
mean that early American constitutionalism took rules of the law of nations and 
applied  them directly  to  interstate relations,  not  as  an analogy  or  inspiration.  
Pennoyer is again the perfect example. General principles of the internal law of 
nations not only were used to make a constitutional ruling, but also were applied  
to decide disputes between American states, not between the United States or its  
citizens and a foreign state.73 That is to say, Pennoyer can be read not only as an 
application of the law of nations as a source of universal domestic legal princi-
ples, but also as applying the law of state-state relations to interstate relations in a 
federal system in which the states were viewed as quasi-sovereign. This kind of 
transposition of the law of state-state relations to the law of U.S. federalism was 
exceedingly common in the early and young United States. 74 
Fourth  and finally,  there  was  a jurisprudential  aspect  of  the law  of  nations 
absent in Bellia and Clark’s account that is extinct today but was dominant at the 
time of the Founding. A part of the law of nations was understood to be the law of 
nature. Vattel made this explicit in the title of his treatise, “The Law of Nations, 
or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations  
and Sovereigns.”75 Blackstone likewise described the law of nations as “a system 
of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among 
the civilized inhabitants of the world.” 76 
But what did it mean that the law of nations was natural law or natural reason?  
To answer this question, we begin with what preceded those eighteenth-century 
jurists.  Hugo  Grotius  is widely  viewed  as  the  father  of  modern international 
law.77 In jurisprudential terms, however, he was a transitional figure between me-
dieval and modern. He was transitional because he perceived faith and science as 
one seamless whole in a way that eighteenth-century thinkers would not. Grotius 
was both a lawyer and a theologian. He believed that the Christian Bible was the 
Word  of  God,  and  that  it  was directly relevant  to law  in  practice,  not  just  to  
70.  See  Lee,  supra note  18, at  1039  (framing  the Eleventh  Amendment’s  command  that  the  U.S. 
judicial power “shall not be construed to extend to any suit” against a state by citizens or subjects of 
foreign states or citizens of other states as manifesting the concept of sovereign equality borrowed from 
contemporaneous international law).  
71.  See id. at 1050–51.  
72.  Id. at 1031.  
73.  95 U.S. 714 (1878).  
74.  See Lee, supra note 18, at 1064-66.  
75.  VATTEL, supra note 18.  
76.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *66.  
77.  See, e.g., HUGO  GROTIUS  AND  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury &  
Adam Roberts eds., 1990).  
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standards  of moral  conduct.  It  is difficult  for  the  modern  mind,  much less  the 
modern legal mind, to grasp what this mentalite´  entailed. 
Grotius’s understanding of the connection between the law of nations and natu-
ral law might best be demonstrated by examining what he considered valid forms 
of proof in the Preliminary Discourse (Prolegomena) to his magnum opus,  On the  
Law of War and Peace.78 Grotius stressed the importance of the Old and New 
Testaments of the Bible to his proofs of the law of nature: “The Authority of those  
Books which Men inspired by God, either writ or approved of, I often use.”79 He 
is referring here to the law of nature as the source of the rules that govern human 
beings. The law of nations, however, was the law of nature as it governed soci- 
eties of human beings organized as nations. 
This second-order nature of the law of nations entailed a different method of  
proof  in  Grotius’  view.  Histories  drawn  from  Greek  and  Roman  antiquity  and 
from Europe after the fall of the Roman empire were the principal sources of rules, 
not the Bible or Christian moral writers: “the Law of Nature, as we have already 
said, is in some Measure proved from [the Bible], but of the Law of Nations there  
is no other Proof but this.”80 At the same time, the principles of natural law “are 
manifest and self-evident, almost after the same Manner as those Things are that  
we perceive with our outward Senses.”81  But, for Grotius, the “Law of Nations” 
encompassed not only “Inference drawn from the Principles of Nature” but also 
norms based on “an universal Consent.” 82 Grotius described this latter type of the 
law of nations, which Vattel would call the “voluntary law of nations,” 83  as “that 
which cannot be deduced from certain Principles by just Consequences, and yet  
appears to be every where observed, [and which] must owe its rise to a free and ar-
bitrary Will.” 84 As Vattel acknowledged,  this consensual  or voluntary law  of 
nations could, counterintuitively, include rules of conduct that seemed  “in their 
own nature unjust  and condemnable”  but  that all  nations  are presumed  to have  
consented to “because they cannot oppose them by open force.”85 In other words, 
a part of the law of nations drawn from the law of nature included some norms that 
departed from natural justice but were everywhere “observed” or  “self evident.” 
Vattel, whose  Law of Nations was published in 1758, more than 130 years after  
Grotius’s The Rights of War and Peace, shared with Grotius a belief that the law 
of nations was grounded in natural law. However, Vattel’s secular and scientific 
vision  of natural law  diverged  from  Grotius’s classical  and theological  view. 
Vattel opined: “The law of nations  is the science which teaches the rights subsist-
ing  between  nations  or  states,  and  the obligations  correspondent  to  those   
78.  See GROTIUS, supra note 42. 
 
79.  Id. at 124. 
 
80.  Id. 
 
81.  Id. at 111. 
 
82.  Id. at 112. 
 
83.  VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 21, at 76. 
 
84.  GROTIUS, supra note 42, at *66. 
 
85.  VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 21, at 76. 
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rights.”86 For Vattel, the rules of the law of nations were derived solely from empiri-
cal  observations  of  how  the world  worked,  not  from  faith, natural  justice,  or  the 
received wisdom of antiquity. As Carl Becker memorably put it, Vattel and other 
eighteenth-century philosophers,  “having  denatured  God  .  .  deified  Nature.” 87 
Consequently, Vattel’s proofs focused primarily on contemporary case studies, less 
frequently on classical ones, and never on biblical sources, by contrast to Grotius. 
At the same time, Vattel preserved Grotius’s idea that a core set of the law of 
nations followed from natural-law principles as distinguished from the conven-
tional law of nations (such as treaties) and the customary law of nations. 88 Just as 
the conventional law of nations was based on explicit consent, the customary law 
of nations, Vattel reasoned, was “founded on a tacit consent”—as distinguished 
from the “universal consent” of the natural-law law of nations—and so was “not 
obligatory except on those nations who have adopted it.” 89  Because the specific 
norms agreed to by states in both of these two non-natural-law branches of the 
law  of  nations  were  specific  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  or  custom  in  question, 
Vattel asserted that a discussion of their “particulars does not belong in a system-
atic treatise on the law of nations,” which was his project. 90  To summarize, the 
rules that Vattel described in his book were limited solely to the rules that were 
ordained by natural law, understood as an empirical science. This basic bifurca-
tion of the law of nations is often missed or misunderstood by modern jurists and 
commentators like Bellia and Clark whose work acknowledges the heavy reliance 
of the American Founders on Vattel. 
The natural-law  mindset  of late  eighteenth-century  jurists exemplified  by 
Vattel produced significant consequences for the interaction between the law of 
nations and the U.S. Constitution. As a general matter, as noted above, the natural- 
law part of the law of nations (that which was neither convention nor custom) was 
perceived as a body of law that could be  discovered or found by empirical observa-
tion and applied to decide specific cases, much like the laws of gravity could be 
applied to specific physics problems. This was not so different, jurisprudentially 
speaking, from the common law, which is perhaps why Blackstone perceived the 
law of nations and the common law as integrated: “the law of nations . . . is here 
adopted  in  it[s] full  extent  by  the  common law.” 91  Under  this  paradigm,  what 
judges do when they decide cases stands in contrast to what the political branches 
do when they “make” written laws or treaties. At the same time, it was believed 
that the outcomes of cases were consistent at a systemic level and could be decided 
by universal or general principles. 92 This in turn engendered reliance on treatise 
writers or publicists like Vattel who gathered, analyzed, and organized relevant  
86.  VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 3, at 67.  
87.  CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS 63 (1932).  
88.  See VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., §§ 24–25, at 77–78 (emphasis added) (distinguishing law of 
nations principles including the conventional and the customary laws of nations).  
89.  Id., intro., § 25, at 77.  
90.  Id.  
91.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.  
92.  See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).  
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case studies, rather than on direct empirical examinations by judges (or juries) to 
find the applicable rules of the law of nations. 93 As Blackstone put it, “this great 
universal law”  was “collected  from  history  and  usage,  and  such  writers  of all 
nations and languages as are generally approved and allowed of.” 94  
Second, with specific regard to the U.S. Constitution, conceiving of a signifi-
cant part of the law of nations as natural law explains some textual ambiguities in 
the written document. The first ambiguity concerns the Supremacy Clause. One 
argument that the law of nations—and, accordingly, modern customary interna-
tional law—is not federal law which preempts state law is anchored in the plain 
language of the Supremacy Clause. That provision states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or  
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.95 
The law of nations is unmentioned. Why? To the extent that the subject was 
the natural law part of the law of nations, it would not have occurred to early 
American jurists that state constitutions and laws could diverge from natural law, 
requiring resort to the Supremacy Clause as a tiebreaker. Natural law jurists at the 
time understood that local customs regarding local activities, business, and prop-
erty could  take  diverse,  heterogeneous  forms,  even  within  one  nation,  just  as 
Vattel’s conventional and customary law of nations bound no one but those that 
had explicitly or tacitly consented. But as Blackstone observed, it was believed 
that the law of nations must be “adopted in it[s] full extent” as the fundamental 
law of a state (that is, by its constitution and statutes) if it were to be counted as 
“part  of  the civilized world,” 96 which  the  American  states surely  considered 
themselves. That takes care of the natural law portion of the law of nations. The 
conventional law of nations—namely,  treaties—is also explicitly mentioned in 
the Supremacy Clause. 97 And what Vattel called the customary law of nations, at 
least to the extent that it corresponded to the law of state-state relations, also pre-
empts state law, at least according to Bellia and Clark. 98 
But I wonder if the debate about whether the law of nations preempted state 
law is overblown. As a practical matter, rules of the law of nations in the late  
eighteenth-century  were  found  for  the  most  part  in  treatises,  not  defined  in 
93.  As  noted  above,  Justice Field’s  majority  opinion  in  Pennoyer relied  on  two  preeminent  
nineteenth-century treatise writers, Joseph Story and Henry Wheaton. See id. at 722. The authoritative 
treatises had changed in the intervening century—Blackstone and Vattel were no longer the state of the  
art—but the method was the same.  
94.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.  
95.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
96.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.  
97.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
98.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 44–48.  
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authoritative legal texts like the Constitution, congressional statutes, and trea-
ties of the United States. Thus, there would have been no felt need for a consti-
tutional provision ordering state judges to privilege federal written legal texts 
over conflicting state legal texts, because the law of nations did not have an au-
thoritative legal text. And that is the only thing that the express language of the 
Supremacy Clause purports to do. 
The second ambiguity about constitutional text is whether the constitutional 
words  “the  Laws  of  the  United  States” includes  the “law  of  nations.” 99  Those 
words arise in two different contexts: in (1) the Supremacy Clause, which, as we 
have seen, provides that “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance” of the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the Land;” 100  and 
(2) Article III, Section 2, which provides that the judicial power “shall extend to 
all Cases, in Law and  Equity, arising under this Constitution, the  Laws  of the 
United  States,  and  Treaties  made,  or  which shall  be  made,  under  their  
Authority.”101 With respect to the Supremacy Clause, the use of the word “made” 
strongly  suggests  that  “Laws  of  the  United  States”  did  not include  the law  of 
nations. As discussed above, the natural law part of the law of nations was found  
or discovered, not made.102 
The absence of “made” in Article III with respect to “the Laws of the United 
States” makes that provision a more difficult call. On the one hand, the same lan-
guage in the Supremacy Clause—“the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made  in  Pursuance thereof”—could  have  been  used  in Article  III  without  any 
alteration of meaning, but it was not. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent has 
tended  to  construe constitutional  “arising  under”  jurisdiction broadly,  on  the 
assumption that Congress does not have to vest all of the constitutional “arising 
under” judicial power and can limit the terms of its grant by jurisdictional stat- 
ute.103 These are two arguments in favor of including the law of nations as part of 
the  “Laws  of  the  United  States”  in Article  III’s  specification  of  arising-under  
jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, the use of the plural form “the Laws of the United States” 
points in the direction of statutes only, because the singular form—“the Law of 
the United States”—seems more consistent with an open-ended reading, like the 
“law of nations.” Moreover, as noted above, the law of nations was understood to 
be  an unwritten  body of rules drawn  from history, usage,  or respected treatise  
99.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
100.  Id.  
101.  Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article II, Section 3 separately commands that the President “shall take 
care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 3. But that reference seems limited to 
“Laws” enacted by Congress; regardless, it would be an odd usage to say that the law of nations are  
“executed.”  
102.  Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review , 107 COLUM. L. REV.  
833, 845 (2007).  
103.  See, e.g., Osborne v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 764 (1824) (distinguishing between 
the breadth of Article III judicial power over cases “arising under” federal law and the limited scope of 
“arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to congressional statutory grant).  
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writers to decide cases or controversies brought before the federal courts. It seems 
odd to assert that such a case or controversy was one arising under the rule of de-
cision, rather than in federal court by virtue of party alignment (for example, citi-
zen-citizen  diversity)  or  subject  matter  (for example, admiralty),  or  under  a 
written statute or constitutional provision. As a prudential matter, the same ambi-
guity  that  makes  the phrase “law  of nations”  so difficult  to  understand  pushes 
against the conclusion that the use of “the laws of the United States” in a  jurisdic-
tional provision includes the law of nations. It seems preferable for jurisdictional 
provisions to be straightforward and easy to police, so as to preclude litigation over 
non-merits jurisdictional issues. If “Laws of the United States” did include “law of 
nations,” then there would be more doubt about which cases “aris[e] under” it, by 
comparison to a construction limited solely to statutes of the United States. 
On balance, my view is that the “the Laws of the United States” in Article III 
probably referred only to statutes, although the cases now suggest it encompasses 
federal common law. 104  In addition to the points made above in favor of that posi-
tion, it seems that the only argument against it is the inference of a broader meaning 
from  the  absence  of  the  Supremacy Clause  phrase  “which shall  be  made  in  
Pursuance thereof.” There is, however, no affirmative evidence that the difference 
was intended to be meaningful. In that situation, it seems preferable to construe the 
Article III use of “the Laws of the United States” to align with its use in Article VI. 
To summarize Part II, the law of nations had a richer and deeper meaning than 
Bellia and Clark have postulated. “Law of nations” was sometimes an umbrella 
term for all international law, including treaties and general principles of domes-
tic law  shared  by civilized  nations.  These general principles occasionally  sup-
plied rules  of  decision  in constitutional  cases.  The law  of  nations  was also  a 
source of law for the Supreme Court in interstate cases perceived as analogous to 
international cases because of the belief that the states retained a large measure of 
residual sovereignty, especially from the Founding to the Civil War. Finally, the 
law of nations at the Founding and thereafter was perceived in part as natural law, 
subject  to  discovery  by empirical  study  and the  systematic analysis  of treatise 
writers. This fact has consequences for how we understand what federal judges 
were doing when they engaged the historical law of nations in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and for the original meanings of the Supremacy Clause and 
of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. 
The  upshot  is  that although Bellia  and Clark  are  correct  that  the law  of 
nations is neither monolithic nor a simple synonym for modern customary inter-
national law, the historical interaction between the law of nations—when prop-
erly  understood—and  the  U.S.  Constitution  is  too complicated  to  come  away 
with a pat conclusion about what history teaches us. Bellia and Clark have opened 
up a Pandora’s box, but their thesis leaves many questions unanswered. In the  
104.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (dismissing original action on the view that 
district  courts  have  arising-under  jurisdiction  over federal  common law claims alleging pollution  of 
navigable waters).  
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following Parts, I will attempt to bring some order to the confusion, starting with 
the relationship  between  the law  of  nations  and  the  judiciary  branch  of  the 
national  government.  The  basic  theme  of  Part  III  is  to  demonstrate  how  the 
Framers envisioned a more active and dynamic role for the judiciary in foreign 
relations than Bellia and Clark have asserted.  
III. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE JUDICIARY BRANCH 
The law  of  nations,  in all  its  rich complexity  as  described  above,  was  the 
national judiciary’s toolbox for resolving sensitive  foreign policy  disputes  that 
came  to  it  through  the  Constitution’s  grants  of judicial  power  and  the  First 
Congress’s selective implementation  of  the constitutional  grants  in  the  1789  
Judiciary Act.  The President, with the  advice  and consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate, makes treaties that are “the supreme Law of the Land,” state laws not- 
withstanding.105  Congress, with the consent of both houses and presentment to  
the President,106 makes statutes that are likewise supreme over state laws. 
The law of nations was the analogous responsibility of the judiciary branch. 
Unlike treaties and statutes, however, it was not codified in written form accord-
ing  to  a constitutionally  prescribed political  process  of  advice-and-consent  or 
bicameralism-and-presentment,  but  it  was  instead  found by  judges  (and  some- 
times juries)107 and applied to the facts of specific cases. As discussed above, it 
was also theoretically impossible for a natural-law rule of the law of nations to 
conflict with state constitutions or laws despite room for diversity as to local cus-
toms. So there was no felt need to write into the Supremacy Clause explicit guid-
ance  to  state  judges  ordering  them  to reconcile  authoritative federal  and  state 
legal texts in favor of the federal, at least as far as the natural-law law of nations  
was concerned. 
In the late eighteenth century, American lawyers, statesmen, and federal courts 
found the natural-law part of the law of nations primarily in British and European  
treatises.108 In the nineteenth century, as the Supreme Court and lower federal  
105.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
106.  Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States”).  
107.  Professor Ritz writes: 
Even the jury, in the eighteenth century, was viewed as collegially involved in the judicial 
search for “the law.” Juries not only found the facts, but they also had the final word as to 
what the law was. There was no need to “report” these jury determinations on the law since 
they would not be binding in any other court, nor for that matter in the same court in a differ- 
ent controversy.   
WILFRED  J.  RITZ,  REWRITING  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  JUDICIARY  ACT  OF  1789:  EXPOSING  MYTHS,  
CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 30 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1989).  
108.  See Lee, supra note 18, at 1063 (“Vattel’s authority was so great before the courts that prior to 
arguments before the federal circuit court in Richmond in 1790, Patrick Henry did not hesitate to send 
his grandson 60 miles on horseback to look for the work that could permit him to win over the judges.”) 
(quoting Albert de Lapradelle,  Introduction to EMMERICH  DE  VATTEL, THE LAW  OF NATIONS, in 3 THE  
CLASSICS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW at iii, xxxvi (James Brown Scott ed., George D. Gregory & Charles  
G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758)).  
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courts  produced  more  reasoned  written  opinions  and  juries  were increasingly 
constrained to deciding facts not law, 109 federal courts turned to the written mani-
festations  of their own  jurisprudence  and  native  treatise-writers like  Story  and 
Wheaton to find the law of nations. Lower courts increasingly decided cases by 
“following law” as declared in the written opinions of the Supreme Court. 
In my opinion, this was a departure from the original law-of-nations paradigm 
of “finding law,” in which the Supreme Court was not so much a superior court as  
a primus inter pares trial court. In the old eighteenth-century model, judges and 
juries were partners tasked with searching for the right rules in the treatises and 
applying them to the specific facts of a case to bring the case to a close. 110  The 
language of Article III and its implementation in the 1789 Judiciary Act reflect an 
original plan for the Supreme Court to function identically to the lower courts as 
a trial court, but for bigger and more high-profile cases and with a new appellate 
jurisdiction  subject  to congressional regulations  and  exceptions. 111  Indeed, 
Article III, by its explicit terms, does not require any federal courts besides the 
Supreme Court, leaving it up to Congress to “ordain and establish” any “inferior  
courts . . . from time to time.”112 In terms of rules of decision, it was a decentral-
ized judicial system where all courts were to apply rules to facts. In cases and 
controversies implicating the natural-law law of nations, the most important sour-
ces were the treatise writers. The idea of the appellate court decision as the pri-
mary source of rules of decision in future cases was in an embryonic phase. 113 
The  sweeping  success  of  the  campaign led  by  Chief  Justice  John Marshall  to 
build the Court’s gravitas and institutional legitimacy and to transform it into a 
“supreme” institution in a judicial hierarchy has blinded us to the original design 
for the judicial branch. 
In  the  new  nineteenth-century model,  the  Supreme  Court, wielding judicial 
review and more robust appellate jurisdiction, jettisoned its trial court function 
and became a “law declaring”  institution. The transformation is perfectly  cap-
tured by Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous assertion in  Marbury v. Madison: 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law  is.” 114 As  a  description  of  the role  of  the  modern  Supreme  Court, 
Marshall’s  booming declaration  is surely  correct.  But  as  a  description  of  the 
Supreme  Court’s  (and  the lower federal  courts’)  primary role  in  the original  
109.  See  RITZ,  supra note  107,  at  30 (“[A]ll  eighteenth-century  courts  were trial  courts  having  a 
number  of  judges  and  juries all mutually  engaged  in  ‘finding’  the  true rule  of law.  In  the  twentieth 
century the . . . jury has been excluded from the ‘lawmaking or law-finding process.”).  
110.  See id. at 27–32.  
111.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations, as the Congress shall make.”).  
112.  Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.  
113.  See RITZ, supra note 107, at 44 (“In 1789, the principal characteristic of state judiciaries was  
their horizontal arrangement.  ‘Superior’  courts  as well  as  ‘inferior’  court[s]  were trial  courts.  The 
important function of the superior courts was the trial function, not the appellate-review function”).  
114.  5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
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constitutional framework, it is subject to doubt. A more accurate statement would 
be: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to find the 
law and apply it to the facts of cases brought before it.” To some extent, this func-
tion may require a statement of what the law is to satisfy the litigants and to pro-
vide guidance for analogous cases so future judges (and juries) do not have to 
start  from  scratch.  Even  with  respect  to  cases implicating  the law  of  nations 
where juries were not as relevant, early federal judges did not imagine themselves 
as makers or systematizers of law-of-nations rules. They decided specific cases 
and resolved  controversies.  The  exception  that  proves  the rule  are  judges like 
James Kent and Joseph Story who were also treatise writers. 115 
In this sense, the law of nations was the original constitutionally authorized 
federal common law. By this I mean that the law of nations was the designated 
source from which federal judges (and juries) were to discover and apply rules to 
the facts of specific cases, analogous to what eighteenth-century state courts were 
expected to do in the ordinary common law subjects of torts, property, and con-
tracts.  Today,  we  might call  this judicial lawmaking,  but “law  finding”  more 
accurately captures how eighteenth-century federal and state judges would have 
perceived their roles. 
The one possible limitation to the license that the Article III grants of judicial 
power gives to judges to discover and apply rules from the law of nations is the 
authority to define and punish crimes against the law of nations. 116  The constitu-
tional power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations” is ex-
plicitly committed to Congress. 117  Moreover, the power to decide (with a jury)  
that a person has committed a crime unfixed by statute and to take away the per-
son’s liberty not only implicates the individual Bill of Rights, but also govern-
mental power of a magnitude that logically requires legislative sanction. Even so,  
there are indications that the Framers of the Constitution envisioned just such a 
power, and that it was believed to be particularly robust with respect to crimes on 
the  high  seas,  against neutrality,  and involving  foreign diplomats. 118  George 
Washington,  for  instance,  gave  this  guidance  as  part  of  his Neutrality 
Proclamation in 1793 during the war between Great Britain and France: “I have 
given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to 
be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the Courts of 
the United States, violate the law of nations, with respect to the powers at war, or 
115.  Kent was a New York state judge and chancellor but was more famously known for his four- 
volume Commentaries on American Law, published between 1826 and 1830, which was the canonical 
reference on American law of the time. Joseph Story was a justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to 
1845,  a  professor  at  Harvard  Law School,  and also published highly  regarded  treaties  on multiple 
subjects including the U.S. Constitution, equity jurisprudence, and conflict of laws.  
116.  See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that the 
federal courts lack common law jurisdiction to hear criminal cases in a case brought against a newspaper 
for criminal libel against the President and Congress).  
117.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  
118.  See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (issuing a grand jury 
charge based on a violation of neutrality).  
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any of them.”119  In United States v. Ravara,120 the first reported federal criminal 
case, one of the indictments against the defendant for sending threatening letters 
to the British minister in Philadelphia alleged a violation of the law of nations. 121 
The great impediment to understanding the full scope and nature of the judi-
ciary’s Founding-era authority to find and apply the law of nations is the modern 
lawyer’s  need  to  characterize  the law  of  nations  as federal law  or  state law. 
Modern U.S. lawyers, Bellia and Clark included, cannot help but see the potential 
for a collision between federal and state law. Late eighteenth-century American 
lawyers and judges did not have as fine-tuned a sense as their modern descendants 
for conflict between federal and state law. First, as noted earlier, they thought that 
the two bodies of law both were ordained by natural law and embodied the same 
general principles,  and  so  their  prescriptions would  coincide  in  most  cases. 
Second, they believed that local customs ruled local matters—property, family 
relations, intra-state contracts, and the maintenance of peace and order—but that 
these customs were logically confined to their respective regions. 122  Thus, there 
was not much perceived potential for conflict. 
The one important possibility of conflict between the law of nations and state 
laws that Americans at the Founding were plainly aware of involved the conven-
tional law of nations—that is, treaty provisions codifying norms that were not yet 
general principles of law. As noted in Part II, this was not viewed as part of the 
natural-law law of nations, which was the only focus of Blackstone’s and Vattel’s 
treatises. For example, there was no default law-of-nations rule regarding pay- 
ment of preexisting debts to creditors between countries at war upon resumption 
of peace. Accordingly, countries were free to negotiate the law of nations rule 
they wanted by convention. Article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace between the  
United States and Great Britain provided that “[i]t is agreed that creditors on ei-
ther side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value, 
in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.” 123 Nevertheless, 
many states passed laws that conflicted with the treaty obligation, for instance, by 
allowing payment of debts by state-issued paper currency, not convertible hard   
119. Proclamation  of Neutrality (April  22,  1793) ,  reprinted  in  32  THE  WRITINGS  OF  GEORGE  
WASHINGTON 1745-1799, at 430–31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939). It may be that Washington intended 
“law  of  nations”  in  its  broadest  usage,  encompassing  the conventional law  of  nations  (treaties,  for 
example) such as the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.  
120.  27 F. Cas. 713 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 16,122).  
121.  See John D. Gordan III, United States v. Joseph Ravara: “Presumptuous Evidence,” “Too Many 
Lawyers,” and a Federal Common Law Crime , in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE  
JUDICIARY  ACT  OF  1789, at 106, 138–41 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (discussing these and other facts 
alleged in the case against the defendant, Ravara).  
122.  See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842) (acknowledging that state law, not general law, 
applied to “rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real 
estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character”). 
123. Article IV of the Treaty of Peace was a particular target of state nullification by law and jury  
verdicts. Definitive Treaty of Peace art. IV, U.S.–Gr. Brit., Sept 3. 1783, 8 Stat 80.  
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currency.124 In my view, the Supremacy Clause—the only explicit constitutional 
provision addressed to conflicts between state and federal law—was drafted to 
provide a basis for challenging precisely these state laws passed to preempt the 
1783 Treaty of Peace. By the same token, a rule of the customary law of nations 
grounded in tacit consent, as opposed to explicit consent by treaty, might preempt 
state law where a federal court found one to apply. The most likely sphere where 
this might have occurred was in ambassadorial cases, as I will discuss below. 
A careful  examination  of  the  grants  of judicial  power  in Article  III,  Section 
Two of the Constitution reveals how they were designed to give the newly created 
federal judiciary power to deploy the law of nations in all four of its manifestations 
discussed above to mediate international and interstate relations: (1) all interna-
tional law, including treaties; (2) general principles of domestic law; (3) law of 
state-state relations as law of federalism; and (4) law of nations as natural law. 
When the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 and created the federal 
court  system,  it  did  not implement all  the constitutional  grants.  But  the  grants 
Congress  did enable, and the  two usages of the phrase “law of nations” in that 
landmark statute, also illuminate the importance of the law of nations to the role of  
the judiciary at the Founding.  
A. THE LAW OF NATIONS GRANTS IN ARTICLE III 
Article III provides that the “judicial Power shall extend” 125 to three categories 
that plainly implicate the law of nations:  
(1) “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of 
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their  
Authority;”126  




(3)  “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” 128  
Part  II  discussed  the  “arising  under”  subheading  with  respect  to  whether 
“Laws of the United States” includes the law of nations, concluding on balance 
that it likely did not. The heading also includes treaties. Consequently, it directly 
authorizes federal courts to hear suits alleging violations of treaty obligations— 
the conventional law of nations. Additionally, late eighteenth-century treaties of  
peace,  amity,  and  commerce  were  succinct  and  imprecise  in  their  provisions,   
124.  See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention 
of the Federal Courts , 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1458 (describing the various ways that state legislatures,  
judges, and juries sought to frustrate foreign and out-of-state creditors).  
125.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
126.  Id.  
127.  Id.  
128.  Id.  
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leaving gaps that natural law or customary law of nations could fill. 129 For exam-
ple, questions arose as early as the Neutrality Controversy of 1793 about the spe-
cific obligations owed to treaty partners fighting wars. On the one hand, there was  
the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Great  Britain;  on  the  other,  there  was  the  Treaty  of 
Alliance with France. The United States was stuck in the middle of seemingly 
conflicting  treaty obligations  when  the  two  European  powers  went  to  war  in 
1793.  Was  a neutral  state obligated  to  prosecute  its nationals  who voluntarily  
joined the war against a treaty partner? Did the United States have an affirmative  
duty to come to France’s aid in its war against Britain? The situation was so dire  
that  Secretary  of  State  Thomas  Jefferson,  at  President  George  Washington’s 
direction, famously  wrote  a letter  to  the  Supreme  Court  justices  seeking  their  
advice: 
The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe produces frequent 
transactions within our ports and limits, on which questions arise of consider-
able difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace of the US. These ques-
tions depend for their solution on the construction of our treaties, on the laws 
of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land[.] 130  
Chief Justice John Jay refused to answer Jefferson’s questions, giving birth to  
the “advisory opinion” bar.131 But he and his fellow federal judges would presum-
ably have answered the questions based on “the construction of our treaties, the 
laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land” had they been presented 
in actual cases. 
The second subheading of Article III, Section 2 extends judicial power to “all 
Cases affecting ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.” 132  The word 
“affecting” suggests expansive coverage, at least including any cases implicat-
ing ambassadorial and consular rights, privileges, and immunities. At the time 
of the Founding, there were no multilateral treaties governing this subject mat-
ter as there are now; nor did bilateral treaties go into detail about diplomatic  
129.  See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.–Neth., Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32; Treaty of Amity  
and Commerce, U.S.–Swed., Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.–Prussia,  
Sept. 10 1785, 8 Stat 84; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.–Morocco, Jan. 1787, 8 Stat. 100. The  
common basic commitments of these treaties were peace and freedom of navigation and entry of goods 
and persons subject to fees chargeable at the rate obtained by the most favored nation. Although there 
were additional terms unique to particular treaties, they generally did not address questions that might 
arise in specific cases, for example, the immunities of ambassadors and their households in the judicial  
courts of the receiving state. 
130.  Letter  to  the  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court (July  18,  1793),  in  26  THE  PAPERS  OF  THOMAS  
JEFFERSON 520 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).  
131.  See Letter of Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8,  
1783), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488–89 (Henry P. Johnson ed.,  
N.Y., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891) (“[T]he three departments of the government . . . being in certain 
respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are considerations 
which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions 
alluded to . . . .”).  
132.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl 2.  
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rights and immunities.133 Pertinent rules were found by consulting the law-of- 
nations treatise. Some rules were believed to be necessary law-of-nations rules, 
such as the criminal immunity of an ambassador. 134 Other rules, such as the 
criminal immunity of consuls (as opposed to ambassadors or ministers), were 
part of the customary law of nations binding on a state only insofar as it had 
tacitly consented. 135 
The Original Jurisdiction Clause of the Constitution also mentions ambassado-
rial cases and uses the same phrase as the second subheading: “In all Cases affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.” 136 The Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction is the only judicial power that the Constitution’s plain 
language  prohibits Congress  from altering. Article  III  states  that  “the  supreme 
Court shall  have original  Jurisdiction” 137  without  any  specification  of  congres-
sional power to tamper with the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s appellate juris-
diction, by contrast, is subject to “such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make.” 138 And the plain language of the Constitution does not 
require  Congress  to  create  any lower federal  courts  at all. Article  III  gives 
Congress  the  discretion  to  “ordain  and establish” lower  courts  “from  time  to  
time.”139 
Why did the Framers feel it necessary to prohibit Congress from divesting the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over ambassadorial cases? The explanation 
is plain enough. At its Founding, the United States was a militarily weak, revolu-
tionary republic. It needed to maintain peace with Great Britain, as well as with 
France and Spain, the other European powers with possessions on American soil. 
Equally as important, the U.S. economy was mostly agrarian and required trade 
and commerce with Europe to sell its produce and lumber and to obtain tools and 
other goods. Any incidents involving foreign ambassadors in the United States 
might occasion diplomatic controversies and even war. Thus, it would be best to 
have any ambassadorial disputes settled directly by the highest court in the land. 
The exalted forum would show respect for the foreign ambassadors who repre-
sented their sovereigns and signal to them how seriously the young United States  
regarded the matter.140 The same reasons would support the conclusion that any 
ruling the Supreme Court would issue, for instance, on ambassadorial immunity, 
would preempt any relevant state law.  
133.  See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce art. XXV, U.S.–Prussia, supra note 128, at 7.  
134.  See VATTEL, supra note 18, bk. II, § 80, at 464.  
135.  See id., bk. I, § 34, at 148.  
136.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
137.  Id.  
138.  Id.  
139.  Id. art. III, § 1.  
140.  See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: 
Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States  
Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1779 n.58 (2004).  
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The third in the list of judicial powers plainly implicating the law of nations is 
“all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” 141 Because they identify mari-
time law as one of their three branches of the law of nations, Bellia and Clark 
acknowledge federal judicial power to decide cases in this field, even when judi-
cial rules of decision preempt state law. 142 It is worth pointing out that there is no 
Article I grant of power to Congress regarding admiralty and maritime matters— 
a fact suggestive of judicial primacy in maritime matters, at least according to the 
original constitutional plan. 
Maritime law had a public law sub-branch and a private law sub-branch. The 
public law  branch  was  the law  of  war  at  sea, particularly  the law  of  prize— 
the rights of a belligerent to take title to captured ships and cargo. 143 Even during 
the Neutrality Crisis of the late eighteenth century, when the United States was 
not actually at war, the  in rem jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts was implicated 
by French and British naval actions that resulted in ships sailing into ports along 
the Eastern seaboard. Subsequently, prize cases arose out of the Quasi-War with  
France,  the War of 1812, engagements  with the Spanish in the Caribbean, the 
Mexican-American  War,  the Civil  War,  and  the  Spanish-American  War. 144  It 
was undisputed that U.S. federal courts acting as prize courts applied the law of 
nations in crafting rules of decision, and that their decisions preempted contrary 
state judicial decisions or laws according to the Supremacy Clause. 145 
Private maritime law, also known as admiralty—law involving bills of lading, 
salvage, collision, and crew and maritime worker treatment 146—was a different 
kettle of fish, by nature more similar to the law merchant. In fact, the law of mari-
time contracts and commerce was functionally identical to the law of terrestrial 
contracts and general commercial law of the  Swift v. Tyson type. And as applica-
tion  of general law  on land  grew  in  the  wake of  Swift,  the federal  courts also 
expanded the scope of general maritime law over the decades, to the point that 
the boundary concept of “navigable waters” came to encompass rivers and the 
Great Lakes, and many claims with only tenuous connection to navigable waters 
were  brought within  the federal  courts’ admiralty and maritime  jurisdiction. 147 
But private maritime law, unlike the law merchant, did not have an  Erie denoue- 
ment. Rather, the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen decreed that 
general maritime law was federal law, preempting state law. 148 That decision has  
141.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
142.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 114–15.  
143.  Id. at 113.  
144.  See Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey,  The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action and 
Judicial Review in Wartime , in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 88 (Christopher S. Schroeder & Curtis 
Bradley eds., 2009); David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the  
Supreme  Court  to  1860,  in  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  THE  U.S.  SUPREME  COURT:  CONTINUITY  AND  
CHANGE 7 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).  
145.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Lee & Ramsey,  supra note 144, at 89.  
146. See generally  GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957).  
147.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 124–28 (detailing the Supreme Court’s gradual expansion of 
the scope of admiralty jurisdiction).  
148.  244 U.S. 205 (1917).  
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drawn much criticism (including from Professor Clark, in a prior article), 149  but 
Bellia  and Clark’s  book does  not  take  a  normative position  on whether  Erie’s 
logic should be extended to the private maritime context. 150 They invoke the con-
trasting outcomes as an illustration of their point that there is no single formula 
for the status of the law of nations as federal law. 
In addition to the three categories of “Cases,” Article III, Section 2 extends the 
federal judicial  power  to  six  categories  of  “Controversies.” 151  One  of  these—  
controversies  “between  a  State,  or  the  Citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  States, 
Citizens  or Subjects”—plainly implicates  the law  of  nations  and  foreign rela- 
tions.152 The subheading, commonly called the Alienage Clause, includes possi-
ble controversies between a U.S. state and a foreign state, between a state citizen  
and a foreign state, and between a U.S. state and a foreign citizen or subject.153 
The Original  Jurisdiction Clause, with its  reference to cases  “in which  a State 
shall be Party,” plausibly applies to all three configurations, assuming that the 
phrase “State shall be Party” includes a U.S. state or a foreign state. 154 As I have 
explained elsewhere, this part of the Original Jurisdiction Clause was designed to 
give the Supreme Court the function of a “quasi-international tribunal,” adjudi- 
cating disputes both between American and foreign states and between one U.S.  
State and another.155 Bellia and Clark do not discuss the Alienage Clause, but 
because it implicates state-state relations, they would presumably agree that any 
rule of decision handed down by the Supreme Court under its State-as-party origi-
nal jurisdiction would preempt state law. 
If, as I argued in Part II, the law of nations is implicated in interstate as well as 
international  controversies, 156 then  the list  of relevant judicial  power  grants  in 
Article  III  expands  by  four:  controversies  (1)  “between  two  or  more  states”;  
(2) “between a State and Citizens of another State”; (3) “between Citizens of dif-
ferent States”; and (4) “between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under  
Grants of different States.”157 Of course, Erie blocked the use of any form of law  
of  nations  in  one  set  of  controversies:  those  “between  Citizens  of  different   
149.  See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 458 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)  
(“In my view, Jensen is just as untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as  Lochner v. New York 
would  be  in  a  case  under  the  Due  Process Clause.” (internal  citation  omitted));  Bradford  R. Clark, 
Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation , 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1347–50 (1996); Ernest  
A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 291–305 (1999).  
150.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 131 (“For present purposes, whether or not Jensen and its 
progeny have correctly interpreted Article III to incorporate general maritime law as federal law is not 
essential to resolving larger questions relating to the law of nations and the Constitution.”).  
151.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
152.  Id.  
153.  Id.  
154.  Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
155.  See Lee, supra note 140.  
156.  See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.  
157.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
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States.”158  The  Erie Court held that with respect to citizen-on-citizen diversity 
cases, federal courts must use applicable state law to decide cases, not the general 
law merchant. 159 But it does not follow that the law of nations, whether general 
law or federal law, cannot be applied to the other three Article III enumerations  
of interstate controversies, or to the citizen-foreign citizen or subject controver- 
sies.  The  easiest  case  to  make  is  for  “Controversies  between  two  or  more  
states.”160 This judicial power was intended to provide a method of adjudication 
for border disputes or other disagreements between states. Such disputes are anal-
ogous  to  border  or territorial  disputes  among  nation-states,  where  the law  of 
state-state relations would apply. 161  And the fact that states are adverse parties 
logically compels the conclusion that state law cannot be used, because it would  
favor one side or the other.162  Nor do Erie’s concerns about deferring to local 
governance apply.  
The question, then, is whether the remaining three categories of controversies 
are more similar to citizen-citizen diversity and in  Erie’s orbit, or more similar to 
state-to-state controversies where the law of nations should apply, even if state 
law says otherwise.  Controversies  between  citizens  of  the  same state claiming 
land  grants  from  different  states  seems  to call  for  the application  of  a federal 
choice-of-law principle  to  break  the  impasse.  One would  think  that  a  citizen- 
foreign citizen/subject controversy is similar to  Erie. But there is surely greater 
reason to refrain from applying state law when one of the litigants is a foreign 
merchant.  This  must  have  been particularly  true  in  the late  1780s,  when  the 
United States was a weak military power and in dire need of commerce with the 
European powers. Indeed, more generally speaking, it is not clear that  Swift v.  
Tyson was wrong as a matter of Article III’s original meaning given the felt need 
in the late eighteenth century to foster interstate trade and commerce. 
When one adds the four interstate enumerations of judicial power to the four 
strictly international  enumerations  of judicial  power  in Article  III,  Section  2,  
eight of the nine constitutional specifications of judicial power implicate the law 
of nations as properly and fully understood. The only heading that does not is 
“Controversies  to  which  the  United  States shall  be  a  Party.” 163 Federal  courts 
scholars  know  very little  for  sure  about  this  specific constitutional  grant.  It 
appears to have been made for the purpose of affording the United States a federal 
forum to sue individuals for civil liabilities to the government, such as breaches   
158.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that state law, regardless of 
whether in the form of a statute or a judicial decision, supplies the rule of decision in lawsuits brought in 
federal court on the basis of citizen-citizen diversity).  
159.  See id.  
160.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
161.  See Lee, supra note 18, at 1067 (“In a fascinating case of historical feedback, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s  water  rights  jurisprudence,  refined  over  time  in  the crucible  of  sensitive  interstate  border 
disputes, now constitutes a primary source of international law in transnational water rights cases.”).  
162.  See Lee, supra note 140, at 1782 & n.72.  
163.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
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of  contracts  with  the  U.S.  government.164 Its principal application would  have 
been to citizens of the United States. However, it is plausible that suits by the U.  
S.  government  against  foreign  merchants  doing  business  in  the  United  States 
were also contemplated.  If  so,  then all  nine  of Article  III’s  grants  of judicial 
power implicate the law of nations in some sense. 
This remarkable  truth  of  the language  of Article  III,  Section  2  is  obscured 
today  because  the  three  heads  of judicial  power  most commonly  invoked  are 
cases arising under the Constitution or under the laws of  the United States, or 
citizen-citizen diversity controversies where state law provides the rule of deci- 
sion after Erie. The prevalence of the constitutional and statutory parts of arising- 
under  jurisdiction  today  underscore  a startling  discontinuity.  Neither  flavor  of  
arising-under  jurisdiction  was  provided  for  in  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789—the 
First Congress’s enactment that established the federal court system. Indeed, a 
lasting general federal-question statute was not enacted until 1875. 165 The only 
part of the 1789 Act that arguably invokes arising-under jurisdiction is the so- 
called Alien Tort Statute in section 9 of the Act that mentions treaties and the law  
of nations, not statutes or the Constitution.166 We turn, then, to the 1789 Judiciary 
Act, which only selectively implemented the nine grants of judicial power enum-
erated in Article III.  
B. REFERENCES TO THE LAW OF NATIONS IN THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 
The phrase “law of nations” is used two times in the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
Section 9, which details the jurisdiction of the newly created district courts, pro-
vides  that  the  district  courts “shall also  have  cognizance,  concurrent  with  the 
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes 
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of  
the United States.”167 This is the famous Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 168 Section 13, 
which sets forth the original and appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
164.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal district courts “cognizance,” concurrent with state courts 
and federal circuit courts, “of all suits at common law where the United States sue, and the matter in 
dispute amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars.” Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. The circuit courts had jurisdiction concurrent with the state courts “of all suits 
of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the 
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners.”  Id. at § 11, 1  
Stat. 73, 78. 
165.  Act of March 3, 1875 § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (conferring on federal circuit courts—the principal trial 
courts of the time—concurrent jurisdiction of “all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity . . . 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their authority” subject to a $500 amount-in-controversy threshold). The Federalist Party, after 
losing  both  houses  of  Congress  and  the  Presidency,  had  passed  a general federal-question  statute  in 
1801, but it was repealed the following year. Act of Feb. 13, 1801 § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by  Act of  
March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.  
166.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.  
167.  Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)). 
168.  In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an alien could sue another 
alien present in the United States under the ATS for violations of international human rights law that 
occurred in a foreign country. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  
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provides that it “shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceed-
ings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domes-
tic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of  
nations.”169 This  reference  to  the law  of  nations  in  the  1789  Judiciary  Act  is 
hardly ever mentioned, in contrast to the extensive commentary on the ATS. 
Section 13 is plainly implementing the Article III, Section 2 grant of judicial 
power over all cases “affecting Ambassadors, public Ministers, and Consuls.” 170 
The statute does not include suits against consuls, presumably because consuls 
were quasi-diplomatic agents usually located in ports or commercial cities, not 
the nation’s capital where ambassadors or ministers were received and confined  
by the host sovereign.171 The statute does, however, include suits against “domes-
tics or domestic servants” who are not mentioned in the constitutional grant. 172 
This was done presumably on the belief that any suits against domestic servants 
of an ambassador fall within the constitutional grant of cases “affecting” ambas-
sadors or other public ministers. It is puzzling why explicit reference was made to 
the law of nations, because the Supreme Court would likely have consulted law- 
of-nations treatises to determine the scope of any pleaded ambassadorial or min-
isterial immunities in any event. The most plausible explanation is that the First 
Congress sought to signal that the Supreme Court should be as protective as pos-
sible of the prerogatives of foreign ambassadors, going so far as to extend immu- 
nity to domestic servants, to avoid offense to their sponsoring states. 
This statutory reference to the “law of nations” suggests an interesting counter-
factual: What if Congress had passed a statute stripping ambassadorial immunity 
in the Supreme Court where the law of nations would plainly grant it? I think it 
beyond doubt that Bellia and Clark would assert that the Court would be bound 
by that act of Congress, even though the Court could contravene any applicable 
state laws. 173 I would disagree. If the President and Senate ratified a treaty, then 
that would bind the Court as the conventional law of nations. And perhaps the 
President could do the same, because the Constitution directs that “he shall receive 
Ambassadors  and  other public  Ministers.” 174 Congress,  however,  has  no explicit 
constitutional  authority  over  ambassadors  under Article  I,  by  contrast  to  the 
Constitution’s references to ambassadors in Article II and Article III. Moreover, if 
Congress could  force  the  Supreme  Court  to  hear original  actions  against  foreign 
ambassadors despite prohibition of such suits under general principles of public law, 
then it would arguably infringe upon the Court’s constitutionally self-executing orig-
inal jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and  
169.  § 13, 1 Stat. 80.  
170.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
171.  See VATTEL, supra note 18, bk. I, § 34, at 147–48 (describing the commercial roles of consuls  
and contrasting them with ambassadors).  
172.  § 13, 1 Stat. 80.  
173.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 234 (noting the consensus among scholars that U.S. courts 
are bound by acts of Congress even if they conflict with customary international law).  
174.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
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Consuls.”175 And Marbury v. Madison famously held that Congress cannot infringe 
upon the Supreme Court’s constitutional original jurisdiction. 176 
With respect to the much more famous law-of-nations reference in the ATS, 
the  Supreme  Court held  in Sosa  v. Alvarez-Machain that federal  courts could 
entertain suits brought by aliens against other aliens in foreign countries alleging 
violations of customary norms of international law that were “specific, universal, 
and obligatory.” 177 The Court adopted this holding based on its conclusion that 
the ATS was not intended to be “stillborn” when enacted, but was instead meant 
to allow suits based on a small group of paradigmatic law-of-nations violations, 
namely, piracy, ambassadorial infringements, and violation of something called  
safe conducts.178 An implication of  Sosa’s holding is that a case arising under cus-
tomary international law is one that satisfies Article III “arising under” jurisdic-
tion. That implication is at odds with Bellia and Clark’s claims about the limits 
on the historical law of nations that count as federal law. 
I have argued repeatedly that the reference to “the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States” in the ATS is not an invocation of substantive international 
law.179 
[T]he legal norms the First Congress had in mind when enacting the ATS were 
not protean international law norms, but rather the domestic law of tort, under-
stood as a noncontract injury to the person or property of the plaintiff.  The 
words ‘in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’ were 
necessary to specify which aliens could sue, not to specify the body of law that 
originated the claim. Put another way, the phrase was intended to narrow the 
set  of local  tort law claims actionable  under  the  statute.  If,  for instance,  an  
enemy alien suffered a personal injury or was deprived of property, the harm 
would  not usually  constitute  an actionable  tort  ‘in violation  of  the law  of 
nations or a treaty’ because international law generally permitted the wound-
ing  of  enemy soldiers  and  the  taking  of  enemy  property. Accordingly,  an 
enemy alien could not bring a civil action in U.S. district court under the ATS.  
But if a friendly or neutral alien, such as a Dutch or British merchant in 1789, 
were to suffer such injury, he could sue under the ATS, even if the amount in 
controversy  was below  the  $500 threshold  required  under  the  1789  Act  for 
general alienage diversity jurisdiction. Most alien tort claims then were likely 
below that threshold. 180  
175.  Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
176.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (rejecting Congress’s power to enlarge the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction as contrary to the plain language of the Article III Original Jurisdiction Clause).  
177.  542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,  
1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).  
178.  See id. at 714–15.  
179.  See  Thomas  H.  Lee, The  Three  Lives  of  the Alien  Tort  Statute:  The Evolving Role  of  the 
Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations , 89 NOTRE  DAME  L. REV. 1645, 1652 & n.34 (2014) [hereinafter  
Lee, Three Lives]; Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute , 106 COLUM. L.  
REV. 830, 838 (2006).  
180.  Lee, Three Lives, supra note 179, at 1652 (footnotes omitted); see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (authorizing circuit court jurisdiction “of all suits of a civil nature at common law or  
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I believe, accordingly,  that  the  ATS  was  enacted  to  provide damages  in federal 
court for aliens who suffered noncontract injury to person or property for which the 
United States would bear sovereign responsibility under the law of nations or a ratified 
treaty. If that is right, then the argument could be made that the ATS itself provides 
the statute under which a suit arises similar to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
which is also a jurisdictional statute implicating sovereign responsibility. 181  
One  other  provision  of  the  first  Judiciary  Act,  mentioned  in  passing  in  the 
Introduction,  requires  discussion.  Section  34  is  the  famous Rules  of  Decision 
Act, which provides “[t]hat the laws of the several states, except where the consti-
tution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, 
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the 
United States in cases where they apply.” 182  The provision has been an enigma 
for  more  than  two  centuries. Charles  Warren  argued  that “laws  of  the several 
states” included state judicial decisions based on their explicit inclusion in the 
original Senate Bill version of the Judiciary Act. 183 Wilfred Ritz, another promi-
nent early American courts scholar, has asserted that “laws of the several states” 
meant general law of all the American states, as opposed to English law, in part  
because there was no widespread system of state court decision reporting in 1789 
or in the then-foreseeable future. 184 He also reasoned that the usages of the time 
would have entailed the words “laws of the respective states” if it were intended 
to  refer  to  the laws  of  the individual  states. 185  And  then  there  is  the  “in  cases 
where they apply” coda, which can be read as broadly or as narrowly as one may 
prefer. Finally,  the inclusion  of  “treaties”  suggests  that  treaty  provisions  were 
directly enforceable as rules of decision in civil actions in federal court, is in ten- 
sion  with  the  modern  doctrine’s  rejection  of  the  presumption  that  treaties  are 
“self-executing” in U.S. courts absent an implementing statute. 186 
The upshot is that even if Section 34 provides reasonable support for the hold- 
ing in Erie with respect to the constitutional grant of judicial power in citizen- 
citizen controversies, it does not follow that it requires state law where it diverges 
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . the sum or value of five hundred dollars . . . and an 
alien is a party”); § 12, 1 Stat. 79 (authorizing removal from state court to federal circuit court of the  
same).  
181.  Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act  of  1976,  Pub.  L.  No.  94-583,  90  Stat.  2891  (codified  as  
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.  
480, 489 (1983). 
182.  Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92. The statute is virtually unchanged since 1789 and now 
provides: “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United 
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law 
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”  Id. (codified 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)).  
183.  See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 , 37 HARV. L.  
REV. 49, 88 (1923).  
184.  See RITZ, supra note 107, at 46–52.  
185.  See id. at 81–87.  
186.  See Medellin  v.  Texas,  552  U.S.  491,  504–19  (2008)  (construing Article  94  of  the  United 
Nations  Charter  regarding compliance  with International  Court  of  Justice  decisions  as non-self- 
executing,  therefore  not  binding  as  U.S. law  or actionable  in federal  courts  absent congressional 
enactment of an implementing statute).  
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from the law of nations with respect to cases or controversies in federal court pur-
suant to any other of the nine Article III grants.  
In  Swift  v.  Tyson,  Justice  Story  asserted  that  Section  34  authorized federal 
judges to apply general law in an interstate commercial case, and that state statutes 
and local usages and customs would apply with respect to intrastate matters—such 
as local contracts, torts, and property-related disputes. 187  In subsequent decades, 
however, federal courts applied general law in increasingly more contexts, spurred 
by the growth of railroads, which spawned related contract, tort, and property suits 
with a plausible claim to general law under  Swift by virtue of the railroads’ inter- 
state span.188 Nearly a century later, the Court’s 1938 decision in Erie Railroad  
Co.  v.  Tompkins jettisoned  the insatiably  expanding general law  regime  under  
Swift.189 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Louis Brandeis, relying on Warren’s 
research, asserted that the federal courts had acted in contravention of the Rules of 
Decision Act, to the point of acting unconstitutionally, by applying general com-
mercial law in intrastate contexts where the states had police power. 190 The Court 
directed the lower courts to apply state law to citizen-citizen diversity cases going  
forward.191 But Erie did not address or seek to limit the use of general law or any 
other category of the law of nations pursuant to other Article III grants of power. 
Indeed,  as  noted  above,  a similar  regime  to  Swift  survived  the  perturbations  of  
Erie in the law of the sea. 
In sum, examination of Article III of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 
1789 suggests that the Americans at the Founding who adopted and implemented 
the Constitution intended the new federal courts to play an active and energetic 
role in the nation’s foreign policy. In fact, the constitutional commitment of am-
bassadorial and state-as-party cases to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
supports the conclusion that the Court, and not the political branches, was to play 
the lead role in resolving suits between states and against foreign ambassadors. 
Bellia and Clark’s identification of state-state relations as a key component of the 
law of nations is a helpful start, but they do not examine in detail its interaction 
with the enumeration of judicial powers in Article III. That leads them to underes-
timate the judiciary’s role in foreign relations  under the original constitutional 
plan. 
Any doubt that the judiciary was originally to be as important a player in for-
eign relations as Congress and the President dissolves upon considering the initial  
Chief  Justice  appointments  to  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  The  first  Chief  Justice  
nominated by President Washington and confirmed by the Senate was John Jay,  
who  had  negotiated  the  1783  Treaty  of  Peace,  served  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs under the Articles of Confederation, and took a leave of absence from the 
Court to negotiate the follow-on peace treaty with Great Britain  that bears his  
187.  See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 16 (1842). 
 
188.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304. U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). 
 
189.  Id. 
 
190.  Id. at 78. 
 
191.  Id. at 80. 
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name.192 The man Washington nominated as Jay’s successor, John Rutledge, did 
not  win senatorial  advice  and  consent  because  he publicly  attacked  the  1794  
treaty Jay had negotiated.193 Washington’s successor, President John Adams, sent 
Rutledge’s replacement, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, to France to negotiate a  
peace treaty to end the Quasi-War in 1799.194 Adams then replaced Ellsworth 
with his Secretary of State, John Marshall. This pattern of appointments by the 
Founding group shows that they intended the Supreme Court to be a central organ 
for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 195  
IV. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND  SOVEREIGNTY 
Part III demonstrated the extent to which a careful reading of Article III and 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 is inconsistent with Bellia and Clark’s account of judi-
cial passivity and deference to the political branches in foreign relations. What 
animates their account is the sense that the original constitutional plan did not 
envision that federal courts could entertain customary international law claims 
from Americans or foreigners who alleged that a foreign sovereign had violated 
their rights, or from Americans that the state or federal governments had violated 
theirs without explicit congressional authorization. Why not? Because, Bellia and 
Clark assert, the Constitution gives exclusive foreign relations powers to the po-
litical branches and so the courts must respect the traditional law of state-state 
relations absent guidance from those branches. 196 Of course, one could rejoin that 
the law of state-state relations has evolved in the past two centuries to the point 
where it now recognizes certain individual human rights claims against their own  
states. 
In this Part, however, I want to suggest that Bellia and Clark may be right about 
their conclusion that an understanding of original history leads one to believe that 
federal  courts should  not  entertain  such individual  human  rights claims.  But  I 
would like to ground this conclusion not in the law of nations, but rather in the  
concept of sovereignty as understood by Americans at the Founding. Sovereignty 
played a very important role in the Founding—Americans fought a war of revolu-
tion for it. And I want to suggest that they had a particular vision of sovereignty 
articulated eloquently by Vattel, whose law-of-nations treatise was so favored by  
the Founding generation. 
Vattel had a different normative project from Grotius. Grotius’s opus was the 
pacifistic fever dream of a devout but tolerant theologian trapped in a time of for- 
ever war among Christian princes. He sought to show that beneath the surface of  
192.  See WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER 145–74, 197–222, 313–38 (2005).  
193.  See MATTHEW P. HARRINGTON, JAY  AND  ELLSWORTH, THE  FIRST  COURTS: JUSTICES, RULINGS,  
AND LEGACY 44–45 (2008).  
194.  See WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 280–310 (1905).  
195.  See  MARTIN  S.  FLAHERTY,  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  (forthcoming  2019) 
(developing the modern-day implications of this historical truth).  
196.  See BELLIA  & CLARK, supra note 1, at 75 (“U.S. courts must respect the rights of recognized 
foreign  nations  under  the law  of  state-state relations  absent  contrary  direction  from  the political  
branches.”).  
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constant warfare and reciprocal distrust among Christian sects, there was a rich 
connective tissue among all the Christian nations. He had enough experience and 
knowledge of the world to know that he could not end warfare—the law of war 
he systematized was extremely permissive of war by modern standards. But his  
vision  of  an  end  to  Christian  internecine warfare  and  the dawn of  a  European 
peace was realized in the Peace of Westphalia. 
Vattel’s  project  was  different  and  more  focused  on individual  states,  not  a 
world order. It was the promotion and protection of new democratic republics in 
a world populated by powerful autocratic monarchies. Vattel was the citizen of a 
Swiss  city-state  subject  to  the  kings  of  Prussia,  wedged  amongst  a cluster  of 
powerful monarchies with overlapping sovereignty claims. 197 His primary mech- 
anism  for  achieving  the  project  was  an  innovative  theory  of  sovereignty— 
Vattelian sovereignty. 198 
Vattelian sovereignty had two key elements. The first was sovereign equality: 
every sovereign state, no matter how small or how new, is the equal of any other. 
Vattel brought the point home with a powerful metaphor: “A dwarf is as much a 
man  as  a  giant;  a small republic  is  no less  a  sovereign  state  than  the  most 
powerful kingdom.” 199 One need only consider the me ´lange of kingdoms, prin-
cipalities, empires, and cities that participated in the negotiation and ratifica-
tion  of  the  treaties  that  brought  about  the  Peace  of Westphalia  to  see  how 
innovative Vattel was in postulating sovereign equality. As a practical matter, 
sovereign equality operated in favor of new and smaller republics carved out of 
more powerful monarchies. 
The  second element  of Vatellian  sovereignty  was  a corollary  to  sovereign 
equality: no sovereign state had the right to intervene in another sovereign’s inter-
nal affairs. Indeed, a norm of domestic non-intervention was necessary to make 
sovereign equality meaningful. 
A republican state in which a foreign sovereign decides the domestic scope of 
individual peacetime rights and when to go to war would not protect the inter-
ests  of  its  citizens.  Without  a  norm  of  non-intervention,  the republic  might 
become form without substance. At the same time, a facially neutral norm of 
non-intervention would protect republics by reassuring monarchies fearing re-
publican influence in their domestic realms. 200  
This normative vision of sovereignty, in my opinion, captured the sentiment of 
the  American Revolutionaries  and  was  one  reason  why Vattel’s  book  was  so   
197.  See VATTEL, supra note 18, at xii-xiii (describing Vattel’s life and career).  
198. See generally  STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED  HYPOCRISY (1999) (providing 
an analysis of Vatelian sovereignty).  
199.  VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 18, at 75.  
200.  Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The 
Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today , 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 152 (2004).  
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popular  among  the  Founders. 201 They  had  just  fought  a revolution  against  a 
powerful mother country that still possessed the greatest navy in the world, vast  
territories  north  of  them,  and  forts  and  garrisons  to  the  west.  The  American  
armies and navy had disbanded with the peace, and there was no prospect of a 
speedy recall or rearmament. Sovereign equality and a norm of non-intervention 
were exactly what the United States needed as a militarily weak, revolutionary 
republic. This vision of sovereignty, I believe, was hard-wired into the American 
constitutional  DNA  and plainly  influenced  the early  U.S.  views  on  the law  of 
state-state relations that Bellia and Clark have ably documented. This genetic dis-
position compels a hostility to externally imposed substantive norms of conduct, 
even if they are pitched as customary international law. 
Vattel was extremely aggressive in his vision of the sovereign right to be left 
alone: 
It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all  
have  a  right  to  be  governed  as  they  think  proper,  and  that  no  state  has  the 
smallest right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that 
can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious. 202 
His view of the extent to which a sovereign can do what it pleases to its own 
people was boundless: “If he loads his subjects with taxes, and if he treats them 
with severity, the nation alone is concerned in the business; and no other is called 
upon to oblige him to amend his conduct.” 203 Sovereign autonomy even extended 
to what might be viewed as uncivilized conduct: 
The Spaniards violated all rules, when they set themselves up as judges of the 
Inca [ruler] Athualpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect 
to [the Spanish], they would have had a right to punish him. But they accused 
him of having put some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives, 
[etc].—things, for which he was not at all accountable to them; and, to fill up 
the measure of their extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of  
Spain.204  
Many in the United States at the Founding engaged in a practice that was simi-
larly viewed as uncivilized. Slavery, famously rejected in England by the estima-
ble  Lord Mansfield  in  1772, 205 was  an essential  part  of  the original  U.S. 
constitutional bargain, as evidenced by a regrettable provision in Article I of the  
201. Additional possible reasons for the popularity of Vattel’s treatise among American readers were 
its accessibility, relative compactness, and readability. It was also written in French, which was easier to 
read than Grotius’ Latin, which was sprinkled with copious and sometimes obscure Latin and Greek  
citations.  
202.  VATTEL, supra note 18, bk. II, § 54, at 289.  
203.  Id., bk. II, § 55, at 290.  
204.  Id.  
205.  See Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB).  
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Constitution foreclosing the prohibition of the slave trade until 1808. 206  It is for 
this reason that it is hard for me to imagine that the original adopters of the U.S. 
Constitution would have contemplated that the federal courts would be open to 
hear claims  based on violation of  customary law-of-nations  norms.  But  it  was 
about politics, not law as Bellia and Clark argue. 207  
CONCLUSION 
Consider two questions. First, if every other country in the world abolished the 
death penalty because it felt legally obligated to do so, must the United States out-
law the death penalty, absent its consent to a treaty banning it? 208  Second, if a 
ruthless dictator in a faraway foreign country uses extrajudicial killings to silence 
domestic political  opponents—a violation  of  customary international law—do 
(and should) the non-U.S. citizen family members of victims have the right to sue 
the dictator for money damages in a U.S. federal district court?  
These two questions regarding the respect U.S. courts owe to customary inter-
national law have loomed large in U.S. foreign relations law scholarship since 
Jimmy  Carter  was  President.  The  United  States  stopped  joining multilateral 
human rights treaties under President Dwight Eisenhower, in large part because 
of fears among members of the political branches that the treaties might be used 
to  advance  the civil  rights claims  of black  persons  in  the  United  States. 209 
Consequently,  customary international law  became  the only potential  path  for 
enforcing international human rights law against the United States and against 
foreign violators in U.S. courts. If this customary international law is federal law, 
then it is binding on the states. Many U.S. international law and foreign relations 
law scholars, sympathetic to international human rights law, would answer both 
questions in the affirmative, claiming support for their view in original meanings 
and historical practice. 210 Bellia and Clark’s book seeks to rebut these scholars’ 
claims as a matter of original meaning. Bellia and Clark assert that not all histori-
cal law of nations was federal law, and that the one branch that was—the law of   
206.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states 
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one  
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding 
ten dollars for each person.”). 
207.  Of course, the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 made slavery unconstitutional.  
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
208.  And if the United States did join a treaty banning the death penalty, despite the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s  decisions  interpreting  the  Eighth  Amendment  to  permit  the  U.S.  states  to  use  it, would  the  
treaty’s  prohibition  take  precedence?  That  was  the  question  in Missouri  v. Holland ,  252  U.S.  416 
(1920), which was subsequently dodged in  Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011).  
209. See generally  DAVID  L.  SLOSS,  THE  DEATH  OF  TREATY  SUPREMACY:  AN  INVISIBLE  
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2016).  
210.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States , 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,  
1561 (1984); Koh, supra note 32, at 1826–27.  
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state-state relations—compels judicial  restraint  in  enforcing  rights  that would 
violate foreign and U.S. sovereignty. 211 
This Article has endeavored to show how the law of nations interacted with the  
Constitution  at  the  time  of  the  Founding  and  the  importance  of  the  judiciary 
branch in finding and using the law of nations to mediate the country’s interna-
tional relations. The Americans who adopted the Constitution were keenly aware 
of their place in the world as a militarily weak new state in need of peace and 
trade with the European powers for survival, and thus eager to comply with the 
law of nations—the intramural rules of the European world order. They recog-
nized that newly created federal courts could play an important role in advancing 
the new nation’s international acceptance and survival by judicious deployment 
of the law of nations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, which is why eight 
of the nine constitutional grants of judicial power in Article III implicated the 
law of nations. The law of nations was the original federal common law. At the 
same time, a strong respect for sovereign equality and autonomy borne of revolu-
tion inculcated a strong norm of non-intervention in the acts of foreign sovereigns  
toward Americans or their own citizens. 
What  are  we  to  take  away  from  this Article’s  foray  into  the  history,  which 
diverges from Bellia and Clark’s prescriptions? For one, we can say that the origi-
nal Constitution envisioned a far more robust role for the judicial branch in for-
eign  affairs  than broadly  assumed  today.  But federal  judges  today lack  the 
foreign relations experience of their ancestors, and the federal courts as an institu-
tion have a diminished foreign affairs function. It does not seem reasonable to go 
back to the past. We should acknowledge, however, that arguments for executive 
deference, or for applying the political question doctrine or other doctrines to ena-
ble judicial abstention in cases implicating sensitive foreign relations issues, are 
contrary  to—not  consistent with—original  meanings,  the plain language  of 
Article III of the Constitution, and early U.S. history. 
A  second  finding  is  that looking  to  the law  of  nations  to  interpret  the  U.S. 
Constitution was uncontroversial and was in fact part of the original design at the 
Founding and in the nation’s early period. But it is not so easy to say that doing so is 
necessary  or  even  prudent  today,  given  the long  intervening  history  of  Supreme 
Court  decisions  and historical  practice supplying  homemade  norms  and rules  to  
which we can now turn. Again, just because it was done one way at the Founding  
does not mean it is the best way to do it today. Indeed, nowhere does the knock 
against originalism as a technique of constitutional interpretation seem as persuasive 
as when it involves the law of nations, given the dramatic changes in the United 
States’  standing  in  the world  and  how lawyers  conceive  of law  and  the law  of 
nations since the Founding. The irony, then, is that knowing the history better should 
cause us to be more reluctant to deploy it without translation to modern contexts.   
211.  See BELLIA  & CLARK, supra note 1, at 270 (“[T]he Court has continued to require courts and 
states to uphold the uncodified rights of recognized foreign sovereigns derived from the law of state- 
state relations (like head of state immunity), and to refrain from pursuing redress against foreign nations 
for their transgressions in the absence of express authorization from the political branches to do so.”).  
